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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION:
A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION 
OF PUBLIC. JUDICIAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
by
David Black
This thesis is a cross-national comparison of corrupt 
acts by members of the executive in Canada and West Germany. 
The paper is divided into three distinct sections. The 
introduction contains a discussion of the method of study 
that is utilized. An analysis of the definitions of 
corruption that are available follows, and the definition 
that is used in this paper is also specified. A brief 
profile of the two cases selected for the thesis is also 
presented.
The second section of this thesis presents the details 
of the Sinclair Stevens case in Canada and the Flick affair 
in West Germany. From the evidence that is available it 
will be explained how both cases uonstitute corruption as it 
is defined in the first section. How the cases came to be 
exposed by the media, the reports which initiated the 
legislative investigations into allegations of corruption, 
are also examined, followed by an investigation of public, 
judicial and legislative responses to the acts of
corruption. In the third section the observed responses at 
all three levels (judicial, legislative and public) to the 
cases will be compared and contrasted.
IV
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Introduction 
A Corrupt Research Proposai
Eventually, every political system faces acts of
impropriety, scandal or corruption committed by members of 
its political elite. When such abuse is discovered, the 
institution(s) involved have to respond to demands for
reform. Although cases in two countries may share many 
common elements, there is no guarantee that Lue responses 
elicited will be similar, as each nation's values and 
cultural norms will have developed individually.
In some instances, legislatures may respond by trying 
to legalize acts that may have been previously deemed
corrupt, because it is perceived that these actions serve a 
valuable purpose in the system. More commonly though, a 
legislature will take measures to ensure that such actions 
do not become the accepted norm. Responses typically take 
the form of inquiries which can lead to penalties,
sanctions, fines, new legislation or criminal indictments.
This thesis will compare the case of Sinclair Stevens
in Canada and the Flick affair in West Germany. While the
two cases are not identical in terms of the abuse that 
occurred (Stevens used his Cabinet position to seek
financial aid for his company, while Flick bribed members of
the executive to grant him tax concessions), they illustrate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2how two political systems reacted to activities that 
breached an established standard of conduct. Such responses 
take three forms: legislative, judicial and public. By
examining each of these, it will be possible to show 
discrepancies, inadequacies and the variations in response 
taken in these two distinct political cultures, and to 
account for these differences.
Chapter One will introduce the research methods used as 
well as define what is meant by corruption. Definitions can 
vary from person to person and case to case. Definitions 
may be culturally bound, and therefore cannot be easily 
transferred in a cross-national examination. This chapter 
will also contain a review of the various approaches used in 
the examination of corruption, which will provide the 
context for this research.
The second and third chapters examine in detail the 
Stevens case and the Flick affair. Included in these 
examinations are the charges brought against the ministers 
in each country and how the evidence in the cases was 
uncovered. Emphasis will be placed on the press and how it 
made evidence public, and the role that it may have played 
in uncovering evidence. Attention must also be paid to the 
legislatures’ efforts to assist in the resolution of the 
cases. Finally, the cases will be assessed with respect to 
definitional criteria so as to ascertain whether or not the 
cases constituted corruption.
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3Chapter Four consists of examinations of legislative, 
judicial and public responses to the activities. The 
legislative response will be most interesting to examine 
because both the House of Commons and the Bundestag have had 
to address obvious areas of weakness in the legislation that 
governs executive behaviour. Legislative self-examination 
has been spurred on by allegations of, as well as actual 
incidents of executive misconduct. Neither of these two 
legislative bodies is under any legal obligation to reform 
their guidelines, and if they do proceed with new 
legislation, there is no guarantee that it will incorporate 
any suggestions from the public or the judiciary.
The judicial response can only determine guilt or 
innocence - relatively black and white when compared to the 
emotional response of the public. In this comparison, it is 
also important to see what the two judicial bodies have 
suggested in terms of reforming non-comprehensive 
legislation. Public response will be studied by dividing 
the population into two separate and distinct segments. 
First there is the general public, and how opinions toward 
government changed as facts became known. Second is the 
elite public response, which includes both media reports and 
academic judgments. Finally, the two cases will be put in 
the context of the other nation's political culture. By 
doing this, it may be possible to estimate how the Bundestag 
would respond to a conflict of interest case such as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4Stevens, and how the Canadian House of Commons might react 
to the bribery of the Flick affair.
Although research has been conducted in the field of 
political corruption, it has been episodic. Interest in the 
field is usually generated by the exposure of specific cases 
of corruption: one of the best examples was Watergate.
After Watergate political scientists looked at corruption’s 
causes and effects, and how it might influence politicians' 
behaviour in the future. Much of the investigation into 
allegations of corruption has been carried out by the press.
The existing academic literature shows that much of the 
work done on corruption has focused on single cases, or 
seeing how reactions to similar cases of corruption differ 
within a nation over time. Comparative studies are now 
being more widely conducted, but this is still a relatively 
new field. This thesis does not claim to formulate 
solutions that would bring corruption to an end. However, 
an intensive comparative study of two distinct cases of 
corruption and responses to it, should provide a solid 
foundation upon which further work can build.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter One: The Study of Political Corruption
Methods
This thesis will examine two contemporary acts of 
corruption in Canada and West Germany. The legislative, 
judicial and public responses evoked will be compared and 
contrasted. This study can be considered a similar systems 
comparison. Canada and West Germany are both parliamentary 
democracies; both have bi-cameral legislatures, and both are 
federal states. Due to governmental structures, the
executive of each nation derives its authority directly from 
the legislature. This is a most important factor because 
the focus of the thesis will be on actions taken by members 
of the executive, and the response of the legislature, if 
any, to curb similar acts in the future.
An examination of Canada and West Germany has one other 
advantage. In both nations, members of the executive are 
usually selected exclusively from the lower legislative body 
(the House of Commons in Canada, and the Bundestag in West 
Germany), and continue to serve as members of their 
respective legislatures. In the event a member of the 
executive is chosen from the private sector, that person 
must get elected to the legislature.
Regardless of from where a minister is appointed to 
Cabinet, he/she is still responsible to the legislature
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6while serving on the executive, so ministers must continue 
to abide by the legislature's rules, written and/or 
unwritten. This enables the legislature to take action 
against members of the executive for misconduct. In a 
political system where the executive is separate from the 
legislature, as is mandated in the United States by the 
separation of power doctrine, there may be little or no 
response by the legislative body to executive misconduct. 
The similar systems approach has been selected because 
political cultures of individual nations may respond 
differently to similar acts of corruption
To ensure that a fair comparison can be made between
Canadian and West German responses to corruption, the cases 
themselves must be comparable. They must be similar in 
magnitude and scope, and ultimately be perceived as
unequivocal cases of financial impropriety - intrusions of 
private pecuniary interests on legislative/executive 
independence. Also, they must have been resolved in the
same time frame. Specifying these qualifications ensures an 
opportunity to see how legislative, judicial and public 
responses vary only over space, time will not be a concern.
Defining Corruption
Definitions of corruption abound as many different 
approaches are taken in defining the term. There are valid
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7reasons for such variances. This may result from the 
transitory nature of standards that measurr behaviour, which 
are ever changing. Personal subjectivity can also influence 
an individual's perception of what is corrupt. The 
existence of different definitions can seem overwhelming 
when trying to select a working definition for a study. But 
this task is made somewhat easier when the definitions are 
organized within a framework. The classification schema 
established by John Peters and Susan Welch in their article: 
"Political Corruption in America" will be utilized. Peters 
and Welch divided definitions into those based on three 
criteria, legalistic, public interest or public opinion.
Of these three categories, the easiest to distinguish 
is legalistic. Legalistic definitions require an act to 
violate the laws or rules of behaviour established by the 
political system. Colin Leys utilizes a legalistic 
definition stating that: "What is at issue is... the
existence of a standard of behavior according to which the 
action in question breaks some rule, written or unwritten, 
about the proper purposes to which a public office or a 
public institution may be put" (1).
Legalistic definitions have advantages over both public 
interest and public opinion definitions. Unlike public 
opinion definitions, those in the legalistic category are 
not conditional upon society having knowledge of an act and, 
on the basis of this information, to pass judgement on the
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8act for the act to be considered corrupt. Since rules can
be applied to an action which can define the act as corrupt,
there is no need to rely on a politician's private decision
as to whether or not an act is in the public's interest.
Criteria for legalistic definitions can be found in two
forms, either formal rules of ethics that have been
established through a criminal code, or by informal codes of
conduct which are not enforced through the power of law.
Peters and Welch suggested a number of legalistic
definitions in studies they conducted on how legislators
view questionable (corrupt) behaviour in the United States.
In one definition which they present, it is clearly stated
that corruption occurs when the activity in question
violates a formal rule or law;
The definition of political corruption based on a 
legalistic criteria assumes that political
behaviour is corrupt when it violates some formal 
standard or rule of behaviour set down by a 
political system for its public officials (2).
This is obviously a simplistic way of identifying a case of
corruption; actions either conform to, or violate existing
laws.
For a case of corruption to be tried in a court of law, 
an action must violate some legal criteria. When standards 
other than legal codes have been breached (such as the code 
of ethics in Canada), the responsibility of investigation 
and prosecution of the case is left to the legislative body 
itself. Although legalistic definitions of corruption carry
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9the authority of a strict code, a limitation does exist: 
not all illegal acts are corrupt, and not all corrupt acts 
are illegal (3). Because this immediately reduces the 
effectiveness of legal definitions in terms of determining 
if an act is corrupt, there is a need to expand on the 
criteria.
A second category of definitions focuses on public 
(common) interest. In this type of definition, harm to the 
public interest is seen as the fundamental quality of 
corrupt acts - an act is deemed corrupt to the extent that 
this interest is harmed. Problems do exist in that it can 
be difficult to prove the public interest has been harmed. 
The difficulty is that it is easy for a politician to claim 
that any and all actions are taken on behalf of the public's 
best interest (4).
The best example of a public interest definition is 
very basic, for example: "the term 'political corruption'
encompasses those acts whereby private gain is made at 
public expense" (5). It is difficult to determine if an act 
is carried out at the public's expense unless it is measured 
against acts that the public could within reason consider to 
be part of the realm of public office. And because an act 
of political corruption may not interfere with officials' 
duties in representing their constituency, it may never be 
considered corrupt by the public.
In a more restrictive vein is Jacob van Klaveren's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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definition of corruption. Van Klaveren views corruption as 
occurring when a public official takes advantage of his/her 
position to derive as many private benefits as possible from 
the public and in return will carry out official duties: "he 
[the public official] can abuse his monopoly position for 
exploitation of the public by extorting for each official 
act the maximum reward that the subject with whom he is 
dealing is willing to pay" (6). This definition leaves
little room for negotiation. Defining an act as corrupt is 
not conditional upon whether politicians or the public 
interpret the act as being in the public interest in this 
definition. Although this appears to be a legalistic 
definition, it also encompasses public interest elements
because paying for the carrying out of official duties would 
not be in the public interest.
Van Klaveren's definition appears lacking in only one 
respect. He does not look at acts beyond official duties, 
which is necessary in a study of corruption. Although many 
elected political officials have wide and sweeping powers, 
there is also the question of influence. The more authority 
a position is granted, the more influence the individual 
holding it will have over others. For instance, a Cabinet
member can influence decisions of civil servants, while a
legislator may not have this authority. Therefore, persons 
could influence decisions that are not necessarily theirs to 
make.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Carl Friedrich picks up on public interest definitions 
where Van Klaveren leaves off. The definition of corruption 
provided by Friedrich states; “there is typically a gain for 
the corrupter and the corrupted, and loss for others, 
involved in such a situation" (7). As with Van Klaveren, 
Friedrich notes there is a gain for those directly involved 
in the corruption, but the definition goes further. It 
addresses the fact that some will suffer a loss. Even if 
members of the general public never come to know of any 
transactions that took place between public figures and 
private citizens, the consequences of such actions may 
hamper the ability of many citizens to request and obtain 
political action on their behalf.
The final category of definitions is public opinion 
based. These definitions dictate that the mass public must 
know of, and disapprove of a public official's behaviour in 
order for it to be deemed corrupt. But studies have shown 
public response to acts is ambiguous, or there may be sharp 
divisions in public opinion. Second, differences may exist 
between the public's and political elite's assessments of 
conduct because the two groups will apply different sets of 
standards to the same act (8).
Colin Leys has also offered a good example of a public 
opinion definition. In this category. Leys defined 
corruption as a perception of society and an individual: "an 
act is presumably only corrupt if society condemns it as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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such, and if the doer is afflicted with a sense of guilt 
when he does i f  (9). According to this definition, there 
are two separate requirements that must be satisfied in 
order to define an act as corrupt. The first requirement is 
society knowing of, and condemning the act. This assumes 
that society will know all the relevant details of a 
questionable act, and from this will decide if the act is or 
is not acceptable within that society's norms. As stated in 
the work of Peters and Welch, this type of definition 
suffers from the two inherent weaknesses - different 
standards and ambiguity.
Rarely does the public have an opportunity to learn the 
facts of an act of corruption, and even if the public does, 
there is no guarantee that it will find such acts 
objectionable: "Corruption may occur without ever coming to 
light, or may elicit little mass response if it does become 
known" (10). As well. Leys' definition assumes that the 
public official involved in corruption will have a guilty 
conscience for actions taken. One problem exists with this 
qualification, simply that many people who become involved 
in corruption do so of their own free will, which may 
translate into no sense of remorse over having become 
involved in these activities.
Because conscience will not be a concern for the 
officials that choose to take part in corruption, it should 
be recognized that these people, by their actions, are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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undermining the system, and the principles that the system 
has been built on: "The principle of responsibility states
that legislators have an obligation to contribute to the 
effective institutional functioning of the democratic 
legislative process" (11). By becoming involved in
corruption, a representative would be diluting the principle 
of effective institutional functioning through the 
requirement of incentives.
'Equal representation for all' is another principle 
that is distorted by corrupt practices. By accepting gifts 
for carrying out legislative actions, legislators are 
setting a dangerous precedent. Such actions illustrate that 
only those with financial clout will be able to command 
action. Exhibiting such favouritism gives the distinct 
impression that those with lesser financial resources will 
not receive the same attention.
Both public interest and public opinion definitions 
neglect to recognize the practicality and convenience of 
applying a code of conduct that might determine if an action 
is corrupt. Instead of determining an action's credibility 
against established norms, it is only seen whether it fits 
into a vague notion of what the public and/or legislators 
consider to be corrupt activities, and assumes all other 
activities to be acceptable. Codes can also prescribe 
measures an official can take to avoid actual or apparent 
corrupt situations. Instead, the two final categories of
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definitions assume conduct to be corrupt if the official
expects direct or future benefits for carrying out tasks
expected of them, or performing special favours beyond their
jurisdiction. Members of the public should not, and must
not accept such abuses of official responsibilities:
Taking or offering bribes...cannot be morally 
condoned, and those civil servants and officials 
of government who are involved in bribery are 
taking advantage of their offices and their public 
trust for a personal gain that cannot be 
justified (12).
If these actions do become the accepted norm, the political 
culture has been distorted, giving a bias to those with 
wealth.
For this thesis, a definition that encompasses the 
three categories identified by Peters and Welch will be used 
to test if the cases are examples of corruption. In this 
thesis, corruption will have occurred if a public official, 
or officials, either elected or appointed, has benefitted 
privately in return for granting a private citizen special 
favours. Special favours are defined here as acts by an
official that are not normally performed on behalf of 
members of the public, nor are they routine acts of a 
legislator (a breach of official duties).
This definition is legalistic in that it requires the 
legislator to violate his/her duties to grant a citizen a 
favour. Public interest is also present in that the
official will benefit by carrying out any special acts on a 
private citizen's behalf. As mentioned, this means people
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with limited financial resources cannot ask for, or will 
probably not receive, similar preferential treatment, which 
would not be in the public interest. Implicit in this 
definition is the notion that public opinion would not 
support nor accept such behaviour because it creates 
inequity in access to the political system, and it grants 
officials the opportunity to extract more benefits from the 
system then they are entitled to.
The Study of Corruption
Most studies of corruption tend to focus on a single 
nation and are conducted in one of two fashions. First, 
some studies are analyses of a single case of corruption. 
Second, comparative studies examine two or more corrupt acts 
that have occurred in one nation over a given period of 
time. This allows a comparison of judicial and legislative 
responses over time to be carried out.
These two forms of study attempt to grade the severity 
of corruption. Any conclusion as to the severity of an 
action will be dependent upon the academic or legalistic 
definition that is used by the investigator. Such studies 
also attempt to define whether or not corruption is 
functional within the society that it takes place in. In 
the circumstance that corruption does serve a purpose, it is 
important to then decide whether the citizens accept
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corruption as part of normal political life. Another
approach to studying corruption is to focus on now a form of 
payment prompts an official to take action. Seldom are the 
questions of representative inequalities that corruption 
promotes of primary concern.
There are a couple of problems inherent in the study of 
political corruption. First, there are no universally 
applicable standards of behaviour that could govern the
actions of public officials. Instead, each legislature
establishes codes individually, so no one set of guidelines
may share anything with the rules another nation's
legislature has adopted. Second, it is difficult to 
determine what type of controls, if any, are in place in 
each nation in an attempt to regulate the actions of those 
in positions of authority. This results from obscure, and 
often secretive codes that are released only to legislators.
It cannot be expected that rules will be exactly the
same, or even somewhat similar, in any two nations,
specifically the two in this thesis. Discrepancies found 
between Canadian and German guidelines may stem from the
fact that the Flick affair was bribery and Stevens violated
conflict of interest codes, and rules governing two 
different types of behaviour should vary. Aside from this, 
regulations could well differ in magnitude. As previously 
mentioned, this may be a result of legislatures trusting 
their members' judgement, or it could be a case of not
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foreseeing a specific abuse. But it will also be seen in 
the West German case that in some instances, legislatures 
avoid addressing certain areas of abuse, or may in fact 
attempt to legitimize questionable activities.
Another difficulty in standards or ethical codes is 
their inability to identify an acceptable definition of 
corruption. To further complicate matters, there is no 
guarantee that each legislator's private definition of 
corruption has been incorporated into these codes. This 
difficulty is illustrated in detail in the work of Steven 
Chibnall and Peter lj<iUnders: "Worlds Apart; Notes on the
Social Reality of Corruption". Definitions of corruption 
vary, and this problem can be observed in a friendship, 
where a habit that may have been acceptable between friends, 
may not necessarily be accepted by the rest of society. The 
behaviour of public officials is measured in accordance with 
public guidelines, whether these are broadly accepted social 
mores, or ethics legislated by the government. An 
official's private definition will be substituted by public 
standards :
The implication of the existence of alternative 
moralities and classificatory procedures for
deviant behaviour is that, while members of a 
social group may routinely operate with their own 
set of largely unexplicated rules and 
interpretative criteria, they are forced to 
address themselves to the categorical code of law 
when formally called upon to account for
problematic behaviour (13).
As will be seen in the case of Sinclair Stevens,
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definitions of corruption varied between the prosecution 
(public) and the defence (Stevens). Stevens felt his
actions were acceptable, while the public perceived them as 
inappropriate. Discrepancies in these two definitions led 
to two divergent ethical perceptions of the act by the 
public and Stevens. In this case, "Previously justifiable 
behaviour is threatened with re-definition as different
interpretative criteria become salient" (14). Because there 
are definitional discrepancies for the term corruption, and 
the different interpretations given the word by different
societal sectors, excuses will be made about such 
activities. Two excuses are typically given.
The first is, 'everyone else does it, so why is it
wrong for me to do it?' This excuse implies that the 
behaviour one member is involved in is also being carried 
out by a majority of legislators, and therefore legitimacy 
is given to these actions: "The essential argument here is 
that common behaviour within a group cannot reasonably be 
considered deviant" (15). Of course this type of reasoning 
has its own weaknesses. A participant's assumption of mass 
involvement does not justify his/her participation in the 
same form of illicit behaviour. Even if such conditions 
were shown to be met in a case, innocence cannot be the 
final edict when scrutinizing these actions by external 
guidelines.
A second popular excuse is, 'how can this activity be
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wrong if these actions do not harm anyone?' The basis of 
this "argument is that public service is by no means 
incompatible with private gain" (16). This seems to be a 
more sincere form of excuse for taking part in corrupt 
activities, because there is no denial of unacceptable 
actions, only some broad acceptance based on a weak premise. 
Regardless of the perception of the public official that the 
behaviour does not harm others, damage occurs to the 
political system. Showing favouritism to those who are 
willing to pay for representation means that those who 
cannot afford to pay will receive less attention from their 
representatives.
The second problem with the study of corruption is in 
trying to define the guidelines that govern the actions of 
those that hold public office. As it will be seen in the 
case studies, both the West German and Canadian legislatures 
had existing guidelines that may be called "minimalist 
ethics" in accordance with the definition offered by Dennis 
Thompson. Under this definition, minimalist ethics are 
described as: "The most familiar form of legislative ethics 
[that consist] of rules that prohibit conflicts of financial 
interest" (17). Most commonly, these rules try to prohibit 
legislators from receiving monetary rewards, other than 
legislative pay, for performing duties that are expected of 
them. It is evident from recent events reported by the 
media, the Patricia Starr scandal in Ontario and the sale of
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Premier Vender Zalm's Fantasy Gardens in British Columbia,
that minimalist ethics are not capable of restricting
financial conflicts. As a result of this, there is a need
for more comprehensive guidelines.
Thompson realized that there is a need to go beyond the
singular restriction of financial misconduct. Guidelines
must be more encompassing, thus assuring that legislative
judgement will not be tainted by outside influences. Even
if it were possible for codes to regulate all possible
situations, there will always be those public officials who
want to use their position for self-benefit. To some,
"morality becomes irrelevant to the pursuit of power” (18),
and in most cases, people pursue financial power.
Although some will always use power for self-promotion,
there is still the need for a code of ethics upon which
legislators can base their actions. Such codes also grant
the public and the media the opportunity to measure
legislators' actions against regulations implemented by
those same legislators:
Political ethics provides support for democratic 
politics in many ways. It supplies criteria with 
which citizens can better judge the actions of 
officials and ascribe responsibility to officials.
It suggests the need for devices of democratic 
accountability, and helps overcome principled 
impediments to them (19).
But this must not be misinterpreted to mean private citizens
have no need, or desire, to understand how legislators make
decisions. Knowledge of legislative procedure and ethical
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codes may instill in the public the ability to scrutinize 
their representatives' activities, allowing them to act as 
secondary enforcers of the ethics that govern their elected 
officials.
If the public displays signs of diligently observing 
the activity of legislators, politicians will have no choice 
but to adhere to the principles they are required to abide 
by when making decisions. This means that "in office, 
[legislators] act on both of these kinds of principles: 
they are expected to promote the general values we share as 
well as the distinctive values that inhere in the duties of 
their particular offices" (20). The need for a code is 
evident, but there is the recurring theme of how to devise a 
code that can adequately perform the function of regulating 
and monitoring legislators, without unduly restricting them.
Questions focus on how strict codes should be, and to 
whom certain regulations should apply: "The organizational 
nature of public office creates a different set of ethical 
problems. Here the difficulty is not which principles to 
apply, but which agents to apply them to" (21). Thompson 
has shown that this is the case in the United States, where 
high ranking bureaucrats are regulated by more comprehensive 
codes than elected officials. It has been contended by 
politicians that they do not need comprehensive codes to 
govern their behaviour. Many politicians believe that they 
and their colleagues can be trusted to regulate their own
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actions. This argument is presented in the modernization 
school, which holds that "public officials...are better able 
to distinguish their public from their private
responsibility" (22). Effectively, this line of argument
would suggest officials' sense of right and wrong would 
dictate he/she do what is correct, and that a code of
conduct would be redundant under these circumstances.
And there is the problem of assuring that all
potentially corrupt acts are regulated, because "there are, 
after all, the difficulties of anticipating in a code of 
conduct every conceivable indiscretion" (23). One way to 
overcome this problem would be to include previously
unregulated acts in a lengthy appendix as these abuses 
become known. There is one problem that can be created 
through implementation of a fully inclusive set of 
guidelines. Too strict a code may act to discourage people 
who may otherwise seek a career in the civil service or as 
elected officials.
A further problem with the study of corruption, which 
has been touched on briefly, is that those who hold elected 
office may feel that there is no need for ethical codes. 
This can be seen in a Canadian study of legislators' 
opinions toward comprehensive guidelines. Canadian Members 
of Parliament feel that they "already possess an unwritten 
but effective code of conduct that renders efforts to 
formalize standards of behaviour redundant and unnecessary"
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(30). Of the two countries being studied, only West wermany 
had existing legislation that condemned certain activities, 
and could punish abuses with criminal sanctions. In Canada, 
the guidelines set forth were formal in nature, but ware not 
released to the public. They consisted of an unwritten code 
and a letter from the Prime Minister, neither specifically 
outlining actions that would contravene them.
It must be remembered that corruption happens in all 
societies for numerous reasons, including the fact that 
guidelines cannot cover every conceivable action of a 
legislator, and not all will abide by the norms which others 
have accepted. Even in the event that a code was able to 
cover all areas of potential conflict, one problem would 
persist, some of the regulations would be left open to an 
individual's interpretation. Nor can existing rules
guarantee full compliance by all legislators, greed is 
difficult to regulate.
Case Selection
A problem |arises when investigating cases of 
corruption. In some situations, both the corruptor and the 
corrupted are aware that they are involved in a corrupt act, 
but there are occasions when both parties believe that their 
actions are legitimate. When such actions are exposed 
publicly, they are subjected to different definitions of
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corruption, which can be based on either moral or legalistic
criteria, or both. In these instances, interpretations of
behaviour will vary between the actors and the legal system.
Thus it becomes evident that the actors have to reevaluate
their actions within codes that govern them:
They [the actors are] faced with a 
reclassification of their privately normalized 
behaviour according to the interpretative criteria 
of the legal code. This [amounts] to the 
authoritative imposition of the legal category of 
'corruption' on behaviour which had previously 
been regarded as largely unproblematic within a 
particular situational molality (31).
Therefore, behaviour that was categorized as acceptable by
the actors becomes illegal when measured against the legal
codes of a legislature or nation.
This problem is rooted in the human nature of those
involved in corruption. That is, participants will try to
keep such acts out of public view. This is true whether or
not a person believes their actions to be corrupt. People
will conduct transactions in secret. Graeme Hoodie, in his
writings about corruption in the United States pointed out
that, "in societies like [America], corruption tends to be
obscure, a condition which its participants wish it to
remain" (32), but it can easily be applied to the cases in
Canada and West Germany. Secrecy has presented a major
stumbling block in the study of corruption because it limits
the number of cases available for study.
The final aspect to be covered is the selection of the 
cases to be examined. It is important not to choose the
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cases solely on the basis of the ramifications the outcomes 
had on the actors involved. Any imposed penalties will be 
examined, but other areas for comparison must be made. For 
the Canadian portion of this study, the case of Sinclair 
Stevens has been chosen, while the Flick affair has been 
selected from West Germany. These two cases possess many
similarities.
In both cases, members of the executive were implicated 
in wrongdoings. Sinclair Stevens was the Minister of 
Regional Industrial Expansion in Canada, and in West 
Germany, Hans Friderichs and Count Otto Lambsdorff, both 
former Federal Economics Ministers, were implicated. All 
three men gained private benefits while they held their 
positions, and these benefits were derived from large 
corporations. Eventually all three men were found guilty of 
improper use of their positions.
One difference exists, the time at which the offenses 
occurred; however, it can been shown that this difference in 
time has a limited effect on the comparison. The Stevens 
case took place from 1984 to 1986, climaxing with an inquiry 
in 1988 and a final decision in December, 1987. The 
involvement of the Flick family in political payments can be 
traced back to the beginning of this century, but 
investigations did not start until the early 1970s, and what 
became known as "the Flick affair" took place in the 1980s, 
concluding in 1986. Although a time discrepancy exists in
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terms of the actual incidents, investigations overlapped, 
and judicial decisions came down within a year of one 
another. Also, actual and proposed legislation in response 
to the cases came within two years of one another in each 
country. This should allow an examination of the
differences (or similarities) in legislative, judicial and 
public responses to the cases to be carried out with space
being the only factor to take into consideration.
A Public Inquiry was set up to look into the Stevens 
affair. At the end of the Commission's hearings, Stevens 
was found guilty of violating conflict of interest 
guidelines fourteen times when he was a minister. Prior to 
the establishment of the Royal Commission, Members of 
Parliament were calling for the resignation of Stevens. 
Friderichs and Count Lambsdorff had resigned from their 
posts before their cases went before the Constitutional 
Court in West Germany.
Another difference can be found between the judicial 
responses in the two cases. In the German case, the two 
ministers were tried in a court of law, which had the 
ability to impose legal sanctions on them. Being the 
highest German court, any decision it arrived at was final,
there was no opportunity to appeal the outcome. In Canada,
on the other hand, Stevens went before a public inquiry 
(which could not impose sanctions), this also left Stevens 
the chance to appeal a guilty decision. The public inquiry
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had no authority to place any private citizens on trial, in 
contrast to the Flick affair. But this did not stop Parker 
from condemning the actions of the business people that 
Stevens was associated with.
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Chapter Two: The Sinclair Stevens CnsA
What Was The Sinclair Stevens Affair?
Sinclair HcKnight Stevens was Minister of Regional 
Industrial Expansion in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Brian 
Hulroney. Stevens was appointed to this post in September 
1984, and resigned from it in May 1988 under suspicion of 
conflict of interest and violation of blind trust
provisions. Part of the responsibilities of Stevens'
ministry was to oversee the operations of the Canadian
Development Corporation (CDC), which awarded grants and low 
interest loans to Canadian businesses. A second
responsibility of this ministry was to oversee the
privatization of Crown Corporations, and consider bids from 
the private sector for purchasing public corporations. This 
function was carried out by the Canadian Development and 
Investment Corporation (CDIC), which was appointed by the 
government but drew on the private sector for members of its 
board of directors.
This was not the first time Stevens had held a Cabinet 
post. For a ten month period, during the short lived
government of Joe Clark, from 1979 to 1980, Stevens was the 
head of the Treasury Board of Canada. As a member of the
executive on two separate occasions, Stevens was responsible
for ensuring that he would not be perceived by the public,
29
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or other Members of Parliament, as being in a conflict of 
interest, and was required to place all of his private 
investments in a blind trust.
But Stevens did not abide by either of these rules
while serving as a member of Mulroney's government.
Conflict of interest violations were in breach of a code
that had only been outlined in a letter from the Prime
Minister. This was sent out to all Members of Parliament
(MPs) on September 9, 1985. At the time, no formally
adopted code existed to regulate conflicts of interest. One
purpose of the letter was to start a forum within both the
House of Commons and the Senate that would encourage the
development of more formal rules of ethics. It was stated
by the Prime Minister that:
I believe such action on their [Members of
Parliament and Senators] part would provide even 
more assurance to the public that all their 
elected representatives and those who have been 
chosen to serve their country in the Senate, are 
determined to govern themselves according to the 
highest standards (1).
Mulroney had made a point of stressing that all ministers
must avoid situations of either real or apparent conflicts.
This is significant in that Stevens was found to be in
apparent conflict of interest on a number of occasions. No
real conflict has to occur; there simply has to be an
appearance of conflict in a given action. Public opinion
rarely differentiates between the two, and either may lower
confidence in the government.
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In the case of a blind trust, ministers are not to have
access to their own assets, to be aware of the financial
performance of investments, or to know of any transactions
within their blind trust while they are serving on the
executive. National Victoria and Grey Trust Company was
hired by Stevens to be the trustee of his blind trust.
Financial conditions of the contract were an annual fee of
$125. No transactions were conducted on behalf of Stevens
while the trust company was responsible for the Minister's
holdings. Over the two years Stevens was in Cabinet, total
charges were $250 (2). The process of securing a blind
trust is more formal than the set of informal rules that try
to inhibit conflict of interest. Stevens had to sign a
formal Blind Trust Agreement with his trustees. A section
of this agreement stated that the trustee was to have
complete freedom over the investments held within the trust:
It is hereby acknowledged and agreed that the 
Trustee is empowered during the obligatory trust 
period to make all decisions concerning the 
management of the trust fund free of direct or 
indirect control or influence by the Settlor and 
free of any duty or obligation whatsoever to 
inform, consult with or seek the advice of the 
Settlor directly or indirectly (3).
Since Stevens signed this agreement, he could not plead
ignorance to the fact that he was to have no knowledge of
his private finances.
Under the conflict of interest guidelines, Stevens also
had to sign a Disclosure of Activities. This disclosure was
administered by the Assistant Deputy Registrar General and
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listed all partnerships, directorships, corporate executive 
positions and professional activities Stevens was involved 
in, for the two years immediately preceding his appointment 
to Cabinet. At face value, it would seem that Stevens had 
all of his private holdings properly administered in 
accordance with the code's guidelines for a blind trust. 
But the government had no way of assuring that Stevens would 
not violate the codes. There is no administrative office 
that ensures that all holdings are placed in a blind trust, 
nor are there regulations regarding a spouse's activity in 
the Cabinet minister's private affairs. In addition, 
spouses do not have to place their own holdings in a trust, 
so husbands/wives conceivably could obtain unrestricted 
access to information that the ministers were denied.
Shirley Walker, Stevens' ministerial assistant had 
acted as his personal secretary ut York Centre before he was 
given his Cabinet posting. Because Walker held a
directorship with a Stevens company before she assumed her 
position with the ministry, she also had to sign a 
disclosure form. But she was not held to the same stringent 
rules in terms of the blind trust, which allowed her to stay 
informed as to how business was going with the York Centre 
group of companies. As well, Noreen Stevens, Sinclair 
Stevens' wife, took full responsibility for the companies 
when her husband entered Cabinet, which meant that she would 
be fully aware of the financial conditions of the various
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
firms, without being restrained by any regulations.
Although Noreen Stevens left no evidence to show that 
she had kept her husband informed about the financial 
difficulties facing his companies, diaries kept by Shirley 
Walker showed that both Walker and Noreen Stevens had 
continued to keep Sinclair Stevens up to date. These 
diaries also listed details of all appointments that Stevens 
had. Entries in these diaries showed that he was informed 
about the business of York Centre by other sources like Mel 
Leiderman, the York Centre accountant. Walker had also 
signed two cheques from York Centre for Stevens totaling 
$50,000, which were not put into the blind trust. Stevens 
denied any knowledge of cheques, claiming they were placed 
in bank accounts he could not access.
There were other entries by Walker that showed Sinclair 
Stevens was dealing with members of the private sector as a 
Cabinet minister, while his wife was dealing with these same 
people as a representative of York Centre. Trevor Eyton, 
hief Executive Officer of the Reichmann Family's Brascan 
Ltd., had publicly testified that on one day, he had 
meetings with Noreen Stevens with regard to York Centre, and 
later met with Sinclair Stevens to discuss CDIC business
(4). Eyton also represented business concerns that were 
inquiring into the proposed sale of some Crown Corporations, 
in particular de Havilland Aircraft, for the Reichmann 
brothers. This is just a single example of how complex the
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allegations of conflict of interest against Stevens were.
The allegations against Stevens originated in stories
printed in The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star during
March and April of 1986. Initially Cabinet members and
others in the Progressive Conservative party responded with
disbelief that Stevens would place himself in conflict by
dealing with Hyundai Motors of Korea. Because of the three
articles, Stevens was summoned to the office of Eric
Nielsen, the Deputy Prime Minister. Nielsen asked Stevens
directly if there was any truth to what was published in the
newspapers. Stevens replied that there was not, and for
Nielsen, this was all that he needed to hear - he was
willing to defend the minister in the House of Commons.
Even on the last day that the House sat before Stevens
resigned his Cabinet post (Friday, May 9, 1986) Nielsen
answered all questions asked about the Stevens affair. And
on all occasions he replied by saying that he felt Stevens
did not violate any conflict of interest codes:
Hr. Speaker, I say to the honourable gentleman 
that my responsibility as Acting Prime Minister, 
and as Deputy Prime Minister charged with that
responsibility by the Prime Minister, is to ensure
compliance with the code [of conflict of 
interest]... which is applicable to public office 
holders. I have done that...There is that 
compliance and I have so stated for two weeks row
(5).
This continued defence of Stevens turned out to be a great 
political embarrassment for Nielsen when a decision was 
handed down a year and a half later by the public inquiry
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that was established. Some political analysts hold the 
opinion that Nielsen's defence of Stevens ruined his 
political career.
However, one anonymous minister did feel that the
original newspaper stories might have validity, and that
this could well be the beginning of a long period of
scrutiny for Stevens (6). On a daily basis, Stevens had to
face questions from opposition members regarding his
activities, and they continually called for his resignation
from both the Cabinet and the House of Commons. Eventually
Stevens complied with the first half of this request, when
he officially resigned from Cabinet. The resignation took
place in the House of Commons on May 12, 1986:
As you know, Mr. Speaker, I have complied with the 
provisions of the conflict-of-interest code for 
public office holders. Nonetheless, there seems 
to remain sufficient confusion as to fact to 
warrant an impartial investigation. In the
circumstances, I believe it is in keeping with our 
parliamentary traditions and practices that I 
tender my resignation as Minister of Regional 
Industrial Expansion effective immediately. I can 
inform honourable members that I have so tendered 
my resignation to the Prime Minister (7).
Stevens remained in the House as an ordinary member sitting
in the front row of the government side of the chamber, but
spoke infrequently after leaving Cabinet.
At this same time, Stevens requested that a public
inquiry be called so that he would have the opportunity to
exonerate himself :
Mr. Speaker, I rise to inform Members of the House 
that yesterday I wrote the Prime Minister to ask
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that he call for an impartial person to conduct an 
investigation as to fact respecting allegations of 
conflict of interest which have recently been made 
in various newspapers, electronic media, and i', 
the House of Commons (8).
Stevens was granted his request for an inquiry, headed by
Cheif Justice Willian Parker, however, when on the witness
stand, Stevens claimed that an air of HcCarthyism had
per aded the entire investigation, "The HcCarthyism
reference was one Stevens employed regularly during his days
of testimony. There was no defence, he insisted, against
malicious people who juxtapose facts to show wrongdoing
where none exists" (9).
The allegations of conflict of interest that brought
Stevens into the inquiry are numerous and deserve some
explanation. As mentioned, there was the link with Hyundai
Corporation of South Korea, which built a car parts plant in
Stevens riding, through the Hanil Bank in Seoul, the same
bank that loaned money to York Centre.
There was also the alleged link between Stevens and
Magna International, the giant Canadian auto parts
manufacturer. Frank Stronach, the president of Magna
assisted in arranging for a $2.62 million mortgage from his
former partner Anton Czapka, which Noreen Stevens accepted
on behalf of York Centre. Although Czapka denied knowing
who Noreen Stevens was at the time he gave her the mortgage,
the deal was suspect because of the large sums of money that
Stevens' ministry had been giving to Magna in the form of
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loans and grants;
Magna has drawn heavily on federal assistance 
programs for industry. Most recently, it received 
a total of $64.2 million in grants, interest free 
loans, tax credits and other assistance to build 
two auto parts plants on Cape Breton Island (10).
Another link that was found between Stevens' company
and his ministry was Trevor Eyton. Eyton had contacted
financiers on Bay Street in an attempt to find financing for
York Centre, This constituted two conflicts for Stevens.
First, Eyton sat on the board of the CDIC, and Stevens had
approached him to help Noreen Stevens secure a loan.
Second, Eyton asked two brokerage firms to see if they could
help in this matter. These two firms were Dominion
Securities Pitfield and Burns Fry. These two firms were
involved in the privatization of Crown Corporations at the
time :
The commission team labelled it 'a remarkable 
coincidence' when, in the third week in January,
1385, the very iinancial houses approached to help 
Stevens' corporate empire were - at precisely the 
same time - being considered for government work 
by a federal holding company for which Stevens was 
responsible (11).
Not all of the allegations of conflict of interest 
involved the Canadian corporate elite. Sinclair and Noreen 
Stevens had flown to New York City for a meeting with 
officials of the Chase Manhattan Bank, which was trying to 
secure contracts for consultation work with the Canadian 
government in the divestiture of Crown Corporations. While 
these meetings were being conducted, the bank informed the
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Stevenses that it would not be able to finance their ‘Christ 
Coin' proposal to raise revenues for York Centre. Because 
of this, the couple decided to abandon the coin proposal.
It should be said that Chase Manhattan did not profit from 
this meeting.
But this provided evidence that Sinclair Stevens was 
intimately involved in his private business, and was fully 
aware of business propositions that his wife was working on 
(12). Stevens was involved in at least one other attempt to 
find funding for York Centre while he was in Cabinet. This 
was known as the La Ronge Goldplay. In this instance, 
Stevens contacted Donald Busby who was trying to find 
investors for a gold mine in Saskatchewan.
Stevens also initiated conversations with Ronald 
Netolitzky, a Calgary geologist, to confirm reports of gold 
deposits at the site. He also asked Robert Callander, a 
mining finance specialist with Burns Fry, if he could get 
financing for extraction. At the inquiry, Stevens denied 
any involvement in these arrangements, but Parker found that 
"Mr. Stevens' evidence in particular directly contradicts 
the evidence of the three witnesses on fundamental matters 
regarding the character and content of the various meetings 
and telephone conversations” (13).
Another area of conflict was with the appointment of 
board members to the CDIC. The list of directors included 
Edward Rowe, the president of Stevens' company York Centre,
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and Frank Stronach, president of Magna International, who 
helped arrange the loan from Czapka to Noreen Stevens. The 
appointment of Stronach was also questionable because of the 
low interest loans and grants that Stevens' ministry was 
giving to Magna. Trevor Eyton also sat on the board.
In fact, a majority of the CDIC board members were 
executives with Brascan, which was bidding for a number of 
the Crown Corporations that were being privatized. Even 
though most of these appointments were viewed as patronage 
handouts, board members could influence decisions regarding 
which bid the government should accept. Most of the 
allegations surfaced as a result of the investigative work 
of David Scott, the Commission Council for the public 
inquiry. However, if it had not been for the initial 
efforts of the press, the entire affair might never have 
been uncovered.
Was the Stevens Case Corruption?
The case against Sinclair Stevens has to be placed in 
the context of the definition of corruption that was 
introduced in Chapter One. Stevens' actions clearly fall 
nithin that definition. By soliciting firms for aid that 
Stevens had granted government contracts to, or those that 
were in the process of bidding for CDIC contracts, Stevens 
initiated a reciprocal relationship, where both parties had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
the potential to, and did, benefit.
Stevens initiated the two way relationship with 
government contractors so that he could secure loans for 
York Centre. Because it has been shown that Magna 
International was the recipient of unprecedented levels of 
grants and loans from the CDIC when Noreen Stevens 
negotiated a loan from Anton Czapka, there is an appearance
of conflict. Coupled with the fact that Stevens was kept
informed of how his private assets were performing 
financially, t?. violated government guidelines, and 
therefore the legalistic requirements were met. Although 
the minister's actions may not have been a blatant attempt 
to violate the conflict of interest guidelines, they 
constituted apparent conflict of interest, which according 
to the Prime Minister's letter, is as damaging as an actual 
conflict.
Even if Stevens had not tried to secure financing, or 
had not been informed of his family business, his other 
actions may have still met these criteria. Board members of 
the CDIC were also representatives of corporations bidding 
on Crown Corporations. This would be a direct conflict for 
any of the members in that situation, and since Stevens was
in charge of this board, he should have seen to it that
members disqualified themselves when such occasions arose, 
if the directors did not do so themselves.
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The Role of the Press and 
the House of Commons in Exposing Stevens
In the Sinclair Stevens affair. two main factors 
contributed to the exposure and quick resolution of the 
allegations made against the minister. The first and most 
significant contribution to bringing the affair to light was 
that made by the press, specifically, the efforts of Michael 
Harris and David Stewart-Patterson, both reporters for The 
Globe and Mail. Tlie second factor that contributed to a 
swift resolution was the Parker Inquiry which was 
commissioned by the government.
Thin inquiry, which was independent of the House of 
Commons, was conducted by William Parker, the former Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario. Ho Members of 
Parliament were involved in either the investigation or the 
inquiry of the allegations, except as witnesses. As a 
result, none of the political parties could take credit for 
the exposure of, or the resolutions made in this case. By 
keeping the investigation out of the Progressive 
Conservative dominated parliamentary committee system, it 
was assured that all hearings would be non-partisan.
The initial investigation into Stevens' affairs was 
carried out by the press, and if it had not been for the 
dedicated investigations of Michael Harris, all of the 
events may have gone unnoticed. Harris, an Ottawa
correspondent for The Globe and Mail, received his first
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
lead in early 1986, when he got an anonymous tip, which 
could not be substantiated, about Stevens securing a $5.5 
million bail out for the financially troubled York Centre 
(14). Because of his limited knowledge of business
matters, Harris enlisted the help of David Stewart- 
Patterson, one of The Globe and Mail's Toronto business 
writers. Together, the two eventually discovered the link
between Stevens's business and Magna International.
Because the story was of great magnitude, implicating a 
member of cabinet, and one of Canada's most publicly 
recognized manufacturing firms. The Globe and Mail ran front 
page s '.ories. For Stevens, The Globe and Mail pieces on his 
financial dealings signaled the beginning of the end of his 
political career. The first story was printed on March 27, 
1986, with the headline "Hyundai-linked bank lent to Stevens 
firm" (15). It brought to light the dealings that York
Centre had with the Hanil Bank of South Korea.
In : 'dition, the story elaborated on the deal that
Hyundai had negotiated with the federal government for 
locating its new Canadian factory in Quebec. Hyundai had 
received an interest free loan and favourable export quotas 
from Stevens' ministry: "One sour-e involved in the
negotiations said Hyundai got 'a sweetheart deal' from the 
federal and Quebec governments" (16). It was later decided 
that the negotiations between Hyundai and Stevens's ministry 
did not represent a conflict of interest, and that any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
decision that came out of the ministry was not exclusively 
arrived at by Stevens, but made in consultation with other 
members of the ministry.
A second story also appeared on the front page of The 
Globe and Mail on April 29, 1986, a little over a month 
after the first. This headline read "Stevens' wife got year 
of free interest on loan" (17). This story exposed the loan
that York Centre had received from Ancon Czapka. This
proved to be one of Stevens' transactions that was 
ever^nally found to be a conflict of interest by the Parker 
Inquiry.
Harris did have a chanc. to interview Anton Czapka with 
regard to the loan and its favourable terms for York Centre. 
Czapka's only reply was that "I took a little gamble" (18), 
feeling that it was a low risk business proposition. Harris 
also attempted to get a statement from Stevens, but was not 
able to get past Vera Holiad, Stevens' press secretary, who 
said “His [Stevens's] interests are in a blind trust, and he 
has no knowledge of the deal that you're talking about"
(19).
These stories also generated a great deal of attention 
from other members of the press. One of the most damaging 
stories was filed by Diane Francis, the senior business
reporter for the Toronto Star. She took a great deal of 
interest in the transactions that Stevens had made. Since 
Francis knew many of the top financiers on Bay Street, it
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was easy for her to arrange an interview with one of its
most influential members. Trevor Eyton.
This interview, like the articles by Harris and
Stewart-Patterson, had a great deal of bearing on the
charges initially brought against Stevens in the conflict of
interest hearings conducted by Parker:
On Thursday evening, at 6:30, Trevor Eyton,
president of Brascan, spoke to Francis. Then, she 
sat at her computer terminal and wrote for three 
hours about how some blue-ribbon Bay Street
brokerage firms, eventually hired by Stevens on 
government contracts, were asked beforehand to
raise $5-million to bail out the minister's
private company (20).
The article that Francis produced that night appeared on May 
9, 1986. When Francis questioned Eyton about the meetings 
he arranged between Noreen Stevens and the brokerage firms, 
she asked if he knew whether Sinclair Stevens was in 
attendance on either occasion, Eyton refused to comment: "I 
don't want to comment...As far as I am concerned it's a non­
issue and I'm not prepared to say who was at the meeting" 
( 21) .
The impact of these three journalists on the career of 
Sinclair Stevens was phenomenal as they were instrumental in 
bringing about formal allegations. When the Parker Inquiry 
was first established to investigate Stevens' conduct, the 
three articles could be considered uhe basis for the
allegations Stevens faced. These initial allegations were
based on contacts the reporters found between Stevens and 
various companies that were either linked to him through
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loans, or an attempt to get loans for the family business.
The first allegation of conflict-of-interest was with 
respect to the relationship between Stevens and Hyundai 
corporation of South Korea. This charge was made because as 
Harris reported, Hyundai owned eight per cent of Hanil Bank
of South Korea, which loaned money to Stevens, and Hyundai
built its parts plant in Stevens' riding of York-Peel (22). 
The second allegation dealt with the second filnbe story by 
Harris, Stevens' personal financial link to Magna, and his 
interactions with Magna as a member of the government.
The third allegation stemmed from the article by
Francis. Much like the charges with regard to Magna,
Stevens faced conflict of interest because he had both 
personal financial and government dealings with Dominion 
Pitfield Securities and Burns Fry. These two prominent 
brokerage firms were hired by the government to help in the 
privatization of government companies. Both were approached 
by Noreen Stevens, after Sinclair Stevens had asked Eyton if 
he would initiate discussions with these firms on behalf of 
his wife.
These preliminary reports were received by Members of 
Parliament with a mixture of rage and disbelief. Rage, 
because a member of cabinet had been implicated in a 
conflict-of-interest situation, although some ministers were 
angered that the press could make such allegations about a 
minister. Most of the criticism that the government had to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 6
face came from Liberal members of the Commons, in particular 
Sheila Copps and John Nunziata, two freshmen HPs and members 
of the notorious ‘Rat Paok*. Both were vocal about the 
different incidents regarding Stevens that had come to light 
through the press.
On May 7, 1986, Stevens was appearing before a
committee on which both Copps and Nunziata sat. Instead of 
questioning Stevens on the issue at hand (the ministry's 
budget), the two began to grill him on the allegations made 
in the newspaper stories. Nunziata announced that he felt 
"The industry minister is drowning in corruption and he 
knows it" (23). Sheila Copps chased Stevens down a hall 
after he had left the committee room, and when she forced 
her way up to him said "You're leaving the impression with 
everybody in Canada that you used your connections in order 
to get a benefit from your position as a minister" (24).
John Turner, the leader of the federal Liberal party 
communicated his disapproval to Stevens, suggesting Stevens 
resign from Cabinet and parliament before his actions became 
the focus of an investigation that might harm the
reputations of both himself and the institutions of
government: "Turner appealed to Stevens 'either to provide a 
full explanation of the $2.6 million loan obtained by your
company or step down as minister until a full investigation
is completed" (25). On the other hand, members of the 
Progressive Conservative party responded to the stories with
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disbelief.
Initially within his own party, Stevens found a great
deal of support. Both the Prime Minister and the Deputy
Prime Minister defended Stevens in the House of Commons.
However Prime Minister Hulroney had changed his stance by
the conclusion of the public inquiry;
Brian Mulroney, once one of Sine's staunchest 
supporters, said that the conclusions in the 
report 'speak for themselves...The government 
accepts the commissioner's findings and concurs 
that the very high standards which Canadians have 
a right to expect from ministers of the Crown 
were not observed in this case.' Mulroney's 
attitude had changed radically since that day in 
1986 when he insisted that the newly-resigned 
industry minister would be completely vindicated, 
and returned to cabinet (28).
The government response to the allegations made against
Stevens had been fairly immediate. By May of 1986, Chief
Justice Parker, a long time supporter of the Conservative
Party, was asked to head an inquiry that would investigate
all of the allegations. Given a mandate from the Privy
Council, Parker quickly arranged to have David Scott, an
Ottawa lawyer and supporter of the Liberal Party, to act as
the chief prosecuting attorney. Scott was allowed to select
his own staff to help in the investigation.
At first, Scott was wary about his appointment, he was
concerned that Parker was selected as the commissioner on
the basis of his political affiliation, and that the purpose
of the inquiry was to make the affair disappear as quickly
as possible. Or he feared that Parker might hinder the task
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of investigating all of the allegations made against Stevens 
because of his allegiances. But these suspicions were 
rapidly eradicated; Parker let Scott know that he respected 
his abilities, and that he purposely chose a Liberal to head 
up the investigation so that the inquiry would be impartial, 
not only in appearance, but in operation.
The inquiry was not established by the government to 
reassure the public that it was willing to address the
problem and punish members who broke the conflict of
interest code. Aside from the obvious calls from the 
opposition, Sinclair Stevens himself had requested that an 
inquiry be set up. As was mentioned in his Cabinet
resignation speech, Stevens wanted an open inquiry to prove 
that there was no truth to any of the allegations made 
against him. Once this had been proven, Stevens assumed
that he would then be reappointed to the Cabinet. Of
course, this was not the final outcome.
Notes
1. Brian Hulroney, "An Open Letter to Members of 
Parliament and Senators", September 9, 1985, p.6.
2. Rod McQueen, Blind Trust:_____Inside the Sinclair
Stevens Affair. (Toronto, MacMillan of Canada, 1987): p.283.
3. Sinclair Stevens' Blind Trust Agreement with 
National Victoria and Gray Trust, pp.3-4.
4. Jim Coyle, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Soenes 
Story of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation. (Markham, 
Ontario, Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1987): p.72.
5. Debates. House of Commons. Canada. 1st Session, 33rd
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
Parliament. Vol.IX, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer for Canada, 
1986): p.13118.
8. Coyle, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Story
of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation, pp.42-43.
7. Debates, House of Commons. Canada. 1st Session. 33rd 
Parliament. p.13149.
8. Ibid., p.13149.
9. Coyle, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Storv 
of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation, p.133.
10. Michael Harris, David Stewart-Patterson, "Stevens' 
wife got year of free interest on loan", Globe and Mail. 
April 29, 1988, p.A5.
11. Coyle, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Story
of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation, p.80.
12. William Parker, Commission of Inquiry into the Facts
of Allegations of the Conflict of Interest Concerning the
Hono’~ able Sinclair M. Stevens. (Ottawa, Canadian Government 
Publ hing Centre Supply and Services Canada, 1987): p.127.
13. Ibid., p.124.
14. McQueen, Blind Trust: Inside the Sinclair Stevens
Affair. p .1.
15. Michael Harris, David Stewart-Patterson, "Hyundai-
linked bank lent to Stevens firm". Globe and Mail. March 27, 
1986, p.Al.
16. Ibid., p .A 5 .
17. Harris, Globe and Mail. April 29, 1986, p.Al.
18. Ibid., p .A 5 .
19. Ibid, p.A5.
20. Coyle, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Storv
gf the S inc lair Investigation, p 52.
21. Diane Francis, "Stevens' wife asked big brokers to 
help his troubled firm", Toronto Star. May 9, 1986, p.AID.
22. Harris, Globe and Mail. March 27, 1986, p.Al.
23. Coyxe, Sine: The Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Story
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation, p.49.
24. Ibid., p.51.
25. Arch MacKenzie, "Explain fully wife's loan or resign 
Turner writes in letter to Stevens", Toronto Star. May 3, 
1 9 8 6 ,  P . A 1 9 .
26. Coyle,  The. Incredible Behind-the-Scenes Storv
of the Sinclair Stevens Investigation, p.155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Three: The Flick Affair
What Was T_he Flick Affair?
The Flick Affair centered around tax credits received 
by Friedrich Karl Flick for profits made on the sale of 
shares. Flick was able to secure the credits even though he 
did nothing to legally warrant them. As a result, the West 
German parliament investigated how Flick secured himself 
these credits. Exposed was a complex trail of payments made 
to high ranking politicians and political parties. In turn, 
both legislative and judicial measures were taken to curb 
the guarantee of political influence through large
donat ions.
Some dismiss the Flick Affair as a simple case of tax 
evasion. In 1975 Friedrich Karl Flick, West Germany's 
wealthiest industrialist, sold his 29% share in Mercedes 
Benz and wanted to avoid paying $380 million in taxes (1). 
So, for some, "it was merely a conspiracy to evade paying 
tax" (2). But, for others, it was a much more complex case 
that involved bribing politicians and political parties 
alike in order to gain the tax concessions. To decide which 
of these two the Flick Affair can be considered, a 
conspiracy by the Flick Corporation to avoid taxes, or 
corruption - a brief discussion of the events leading to 
the affair is necessary.
51
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Legally, Flick could have avoided paying the taxes if 
the profit was reinvested in a way so "that it [would be] 
considered to be 'in the interest of the national economy'” 
(3). To do this. Flick invested the money in W.R. Grace and 
Company, an American firm. According to the definition used 
to decide whether concessions should be granted, to benefit 
the German economy either German technology must be
exported, or German people must be employed over the course 
of the venture.
Flick's reinvestment met neither of these two
conditions. No technology was exported from Germany and 
utilized by Grace, and at most, the Board of Directors of 
Grace had only three Germans sitting on it. No other
Germans were employed by Grace. Although Flick did not meet
either of these requirements, he still received the tax 
concessions. Based on this knowledge and the exposure of 
other irregularities, the Bundestag ordered an 
investigation. The events that were uncovered have commonly 
become known as the Flick affair.
Revealed in this investigation was a long list of 
financial donations to prominent politicians and to all of 
the political parties except for Die Gruenen (the Green 
party). These donations were not made by Flick himself, but 
by a life-long friend and dedicated employee, Eberhard von 
Brauchitsch. According to von Brauchitsch, the
contributions were made on behalf of Flick, and not because
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Flick ordered him to make the contributions. Whenever von
Brauchitsch gave money, he would list the amount, the
recipient, and the date in a personal diary that he kept.
As with the Stevens case, it was the discovery of a diary
that proved to be the downfall of the entire scheme:
von Brauchitsch was scrupulous in recording all of 
his transactions in a diary. It was this diary 
(which somehow came into the hands of the 
authorities) which provided complete proof of the 
extent of Flick's attempts at buying friendship 
and influence (4),
Donations per se are not illegal in the West German
political system, but there are stringent rules regarding
the reporting of such donations:
The political influence of the economic power of 
the Flick-group was not only ascertained by normal 
contacts and communications, but by illegal 
financial contributions to parties and 
politicians-illegal, because they were not
published in the official accounts of the parties 
(5).
A 1967 law clearly states that for any donation in 
excess of $11,916 given by an individual, or in excess of 
$119,180 by a corporation, a complete public disclosure must 
be made (6). The disclosure must include the names of the 
donor and the recipient, and the amount of the contribution. 
This rule, when applied to the donations given by von 
Brauchitsch, was responsible for the conviction of von 
Brauchitsch, and two former cabinet ministers. These two 
ministers, Hans Friderichs and Count Otto Lambsdorff, were 
both prominent members of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), 
and former Federal Economics Ministers. In the entire
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incident, only these three men faced any charges, and 
received any penalties. It was also established in section
21 of the Basic Law that parties must account for all
sources of income (see Appendix I, p.151).
The first signs of pay-offs implicated the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU). Initially there was no indication 
that money had influenced politicians in any of the 
political parties. One man can claim to have found the 
first trail of Flick donations, Klaus Foster. Foster, a 
member of the St. Augustine Christian Democrats association, 
just outside of Bonn, found this evidence in 1976, ten years 
before the final resolution. He discovered a long list of 
contributions to the CDU from a company in Liechtenstein, 
which was closely affiliated with the CDU (7).
Included in these documents was an extensive list of 
clients of this company. Feeling that there were some 
improprieties in the donations received from this foreign 
company, Foster turned over the lists he was auditing to 
federal investigators in Bonn. According to newspaper
articles, the only reason that the Flick Corporation was 
singled out for an extensive investigation, was its name 
appeared on the clientele list of this CDU company more 
times than any other name. Had Foster decided not to 
question all of these reported donations to his party, the 
entire situation may have gone unnoticed.
Flick's financial influence was found to have extended
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to many of the political elite on the German political 
scene. In fact, Flick had become known as the 'paymaster of 
the republic' (8). Estimates are that Flick spent $10 
million in his attempts to buy influence in Bonn (9).
Although illegal, these donations did serve a valuable 
purpose in the political system. The political parties have 
to secure large donations to cover campaign expenses, and
the best source for large amounts of money are those with
wealth :
The parties seek to meet these expenses through
large, tax deductible contributions from business 
and other interest groups... there is a real danger 
that political favors will be anticipated or 
actually promised by the parties in exchange for 
financial support (10).
In the case of Flick money, it would seem the sole purpose
for these donations was to secure specific good will from
the government, in all cases this was a tacit agreement.
Through the donations he made on behalf of Flick, von
Brauchitsch was able to achieve political influence within
the major political parties. By doing this, no matter which
parties formed the coalition government. Flick would be
able to access the political elite when requesting tax
concessions. A second part of this strategy was to make
sure that it would be in the best interest of all those
involved to keep the donations a secret. If anyone gained
knowledge of what was happening, political parties would
have been viewed negatively by the German electorate:
In theory, this was just the sort of case that
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might have brought the liberal democratic edifice 
tumbling down on the politicians' heads. In 
practice, however, - precisely because Flick's 
largess had penetrated so deeply into the party 
political structures of the Bonn Republic - this 
could not be allowed to happen (11).
As well, by giving unreported donations, von Brauchitsch was
able to keep the tax credits out of the public eye; “Firms
are not only motivated to choose illegal ways of donating to
parties because they want to get tax reductions but because
they can keep their activities a secret by these illegal
ways'* (12).
But it was not just parties that were tainted by the 
influence of Flick, whether directly, or through von 
Brauchitsch. Flick's contributions and gifts reached the top 
of the Bonn hierarchy. In many of these cases it was 
difficult to substantiate the amounts of the donations, or 
their effects. This was the case because many of the 
donations that von Brauchitsch made were in cash. Although 
these contributions had been listed in his diary, they could 
not be traced: "In many cases the money was personally
slipped in plain envelopes to top-level politicians such as 
Helmut Kohl and F.J. Strauss by the Flick representative, 
von Brauchitsch" (13).
It was even suspected that Ranier Barzel, the former 
president of the Bundestag, was paid off by Flick in order 
to secure the chancellorship for Helmut Kohl (14). Barzel 
failed to lead the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to 
victory in the 1970s, and
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Because of his failure to drive the SPD [Social 
Democratic Party] from office, he was pushed aside 
for a new leader, Helmut Kohl. The story was that 
he was persuaded to resign because over the next 
several years Flick would pay about [$1,067,250] 
to a law firm with which Barzel was associated- 
and the money would go to him (15).
When this information became public, Barzel resigned his
post in the Bundestag. Kohl was also implicated in the
scandal because of entries found in von Brauchitsch's
diaries.
Documents alleged that Kohl had received $336,627 in
cash from the Flick Corporation (16). Kohl admitted to
having received some money as donations to his party, the
CDU, but disputed the documented amounts. He declared that
he was only given a quarter of what he allegedly accepted.
Kohl also said that
He immediately passed [contributions] on to his 
party treasurer. He denied that he had received 
further sums from Flick and also that the 
appearance of his name against various sums of 
money on a list kept by a former Flick manager,
Mr. Eberhard von Brauchitsch, and Flick's 
accountant. Hr. Rudolph Diehl, signified any wrong 
doing. The money he did receive on behalf of his 
party had, he said, no conditions attached (17).
However, the allegations were enough to bring Kohl in front
of the Flick committee for questioning. Since the
Chancellor was a member of the opposition when he allegedly
received the money, there is some uncertainty whether Kohl
would have been in a position to influence any decision to
give tax concessions to Flick.
On February 18, 1988, it was reported that Otto Schily,
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a member of the Green party had drawn up a private summons 
alleging that Kohl had perjured himself when testifying 
about Flick donations. It is important to note that these 
were not charges brought against Kohl by the state, so it 
still had to be decided whether state investigators would 
pursue these charges. It was widely known that "Schily, a 
brilliant tactician, hit upon the idea of a private summons 
as a political and publicity device" (18). On March 12, 
1986, it was decided by prosecutors in Bonn that they should 
investigate the charges of perjury brought against Kohl. By 
May 12, 1986, federal investigators decided that these
allegations could not be substantiated, so they had to be 
dropped.
But the implications of Flick went much deeper,
exposing an entire political sub-culture that existed in
West Germany:
It suggests that the Flick affair may not have 
been about corruption in a precise legal sense but 
it did, in a political sense, raise serious doubts 
about existing political practices [uncovered by 
the investigation] (some of which have been
changed as a result of it) (19).
Of course these dealings were not part of everyday West
German politics. For the most part, the financial
contributions that were being made were done in secrecy.
This form of corruption had developed its own political
culture, one that was not officially recognized by the
state, but nonetheless used within the state:
Corruption after all, may be seen as an informal
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political system. Whereas party manifestos,
general legislation, and policy declarations are 
the formal facade of the political structure, 
corruption stands in sharp contrast to these
features as an informal political system in its 
own right (20).
By no means were the methods used by von Brauchitsch to gain 
influence within both the government and political parties 
exclusive to the Flick Corporation.
Many other corporations and individuals had employed 
this method of influence building throughout the history of 
the Federal Republic (1949-). Since 1982, preliminary 
proceedings had begun on more than 1,800 cases of tax
avoidance through illegal campaign donations. These cases 
have implicated all political parties except for the Green 
party, which was founded in 1980 (21). This illustrates how 
far non-reported funds had permeated the political system.
These revelations turned out to be a great benefit for the
recently formed Green party, as they allowed the party to 
"eagerly proclaim moral superiority over all opponents at 
home and abroad" (22).
The Flick Corporation had a history, or a tradition, of 
making cash donations to the leaders of Germany. There is 
evidence that Friedrich Karl Flick's grandfather gave money 
to political parties during the Weimar Republic, and his 
father had given money to the Nazi and Socialist parties 
throughout the 1930s. In a sense, for many, the most 
surprising element in the Flick affair was not the illegal 
contributions, but the fact that they had gone on for so
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long without being noticed; “Representatives of the
industrial group Flick...have been shown as ingratiating
themselves by means of cash payments to politicians and
parties in Bonn for decades" (23). Although this kind of
practice had become commonplace in West Germany, in an
attempt to preserve the political system, political
influence was practiced in secret:
the West German political system has been founded 
on the principle that political reliability and 
the need for political consensus are vital if 
democracy is to flourish. There is therefore a 
strong impetus towards the repression of 
activities which might produce a decline in 
support for the system. On the other hand, 
arguably precisely because of this repressive 
tendency. West German politics abounds with 
examples of political scandals (24).
But it can also be noted that these actions have not brought
about the decline or the demise of the West German political
system.
Was the Flick Affair Corruption?
By placing the Flick affair in the context of this 
thesis' definition of corruption, it can be determined 
whether or not the actions of von Brauchitsch, Lambsdorff 
and Friderichs were corrupt. The fact that the affair
resulted from bribery allows it to fit into the definition. 
Two federal ministers received money for granting special 
tax concessions to a private citizen, which is in violation 
of the West German party laws. If disclosures had been made
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of Von Brauchitsch's donations, the Bundestag would not have 
been able to investigate the case on legal grounds. As 
well, the actions violate the public interest aspect of the 
definition. Count Lambsdorff, Friderichs and Flick all 
benefitted monetarily, while the general population would 
not be able to command the treatment that Flick could buy. 
On the basis of this analysis, the Flick affair can be 
considered corruption.
In the case of the Flick Affair, all those involved 
were attempting to hide the fact that Flick received the tax 
concession. Finally, there was the abuse of an official 
power. As V.O. Key Jr. noted, corruption occurs when 
"control [is] secured by an abuse - a perversion of the 
purpose - of the power granted to the official concerned" 
(25). This condition was also met in the Flick Affair. 
Both former Federal Ministers of Economics allowed Flick to 
get the tax credits, even though he failed to meet the 
conditions set out for reinvesting profits.
Flick did not export any West German technology, and 
aside from the token directorships handed out, no Germans 
were hired as a result of Flick purchasing shares in Grace 
Industries. Because the Flick Affair meets all of the 
conditions set out by the thesis' definition, it seems clear 
that the only conclusion that can be made is the one stated 
earlier, the Flick affair is a case of corruption. Although 
von Brauchitsch was a central character in the exchange of
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money from Flick to the ministers, it is not known if he 
benefitted from the actions he took on behalf of his 
employer.
H.OW the Flick Affair Was Exposed
There were three elements that helped in exposing and
resolving the Flick Affair, These were the coverage by the
media, especially the weekly news magazine Per Soiegel. the
West German equivalent of Time. Second, a powerful and
effective fact finding committee that was established by the
Bundestag (similar to the Canadian House of Commons).
Finally, there was the development of a fourth political
party, the Green Party, which was never approached by von
Brauchitsch, and therefore, was considered to be both
impartial and non-corrupted. The combination of these three
elements helped to expose the depth of Flick influence:
thanks to the sense of duty of some (few) public 
officials, the investigative journalism and 
scandalizing interests of some (few) public 
magazines, and the rise of a non-establishment 
party, that the widespread practices of illegal 
party financing finally came to light (28).
In terms of getting information on the Flick Affair to
the public. Per Spiegel did an exemplary job. During 1982,
the magazine continually ran cover stories on the
Investigations of Flick's purchased political influence. It
did everything from printing the transcripts of
interrogations by the state prosecutors, to informing the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
public of the latest news, such as the locating of the diary 
in which von Brauchitsch kept all of his transactions. Per 
Spiegel kept the public intrigued, while being able to 
capitalize on the situation by using enticing trailers such 
as "more news to come" (27), in order to keep circulation of 
the magazine high. In fact, it did such a commendable job 
of reporting what was happening, that partisan magazines and 
newspapers started to attack Per Soiegel because it was 
questioning the integrity of West Germany's political elite.
Most of the reports came out in 1982, when state 
prosecutors were investigating the party donations, and they 
followed up the reports with the final news story of the 
resignation of Ranier Barzel the president of the Bundestag, 
who was also implicated in the Flick Affair. Most of the 
information that the public received about the allegations 
made about politicians originated from Per Spiegel. This 
was because other news journals did net have sources giving 
them information: "Per Spiegel was the happy recipient of
most of the Flick investigation leaks" (28). One benefit is 
undeniable, it provided the magazine with the positive 
result of increased sales when it printed stories about the 
Flick affair (29).
The Green Party, being new to the political scene, was 
not in a position to be offered cash by Flick or von 
Brauchitsch; in turn, this allowed the party's members to 
demand a thorough investigation. Even if the Green Party
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had been in existence while most of the money was being 
passed from von Brauchitsch to the politicians and the 
political parties, it is doubtful that he would have 
considered giving money to the Greens, and it is widely 
accepted that the Greens would not have taken the money. 
The Green Party also provided the Flick Committee with its 
star member, Otto Schily. It has been said that without 
Schily, the work of the committee would not have been as 
effective. His absence could have meant that, "the
revelations might have been more one-sided and muted" (30).
In the Bundestag itself, allegations made against any 
member were frowned upon and more than likely punished by 
the legislature. An example of this was with Juergen 
Reents: "So far, the Greens alone have suggested that Mr.
Kohl was involved, and for saying that his way to the top 
was 'bought by Flick', Mr. Juergen Reents, a Green member of 
the Bundestag, was evicted from the chamber" (31). Because 
of the penalties imposed for speaking out against another 
member of the legislature, little was done to uncover more 
involvement in the Bundestag. This was left entirely to the 
committee system of the Bundestag.
The third component that contributed to the Flick 
Affair's wide public exposure, has already been touched upon 
briefly, the Flick Committee of the Bundestag. Established 
in May of 1983, the Flick Committee of the Bundestag sat 
until February 1986. This committee was established under
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the Basic Law (the West German constitution), and was 
charged with the responsibility of getting all of the 
information that it could out of the witnesses. The major 
problem that the committee encountered was trying to get 
information out of the defendants and government
ministries ;
The fact-finding committee of Parliament according 
to article 44 of the Basic Law, however, had many 
problems clearing-up the Flick affair. Not only 
were the witnesses very reluctant in saying 
anything, but also the Ministries of Economics and 
of Finance refused to hand over documents that 
were relevant for the investigation of the affair 
(32).
This problem was quickly resolved when the Constitutional 
Court found that holding back these documents violated 
article 44 of the Basic Law (see Appendix I, p. 151), at 
which time the ministries surrendered the documents.
Even an attempted early dissolution of the committee 
was cause for some speculation. It appears to have been a 
case of attempting to stop the investigation before other 
private and public citizens were implicated in the Flick 
Affair. If dissolution had occurred, it would have 
minimized the damage caused by the entire affair. It was 
felt that for political reasons - an election in one of the 
Laender (similar to a Canadian province) - the three 
established political parties were trying to bring an early 
end to the committee's investigations, so that allegations 
of corruption would not hurt them during the campaign:
The fact finding committee finished its taking of
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evidence in March 1985. The member of the party 
Die Gruenen [Otto Schily] on the fact-finding 
committee, who opposed the termination of taking 
evidence, suspected that the CDU/CSU [Christian 
Social Union], FDP and SPD wanted to close the 
investigations because of the elections in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen in May 1985 (33).
In West Germany, the Land elections tend to reflect the
people's attitude towards the federal parties, and it was
speculated that a continuing investigation could have harmed
the parties implicated in the Flick Affair. With a dark
cloud such as this looming over the dissolution of the
committee, it is hard to tell if the committee was
completely effective. Clearly the committee was not as
effective as Otto Schily would have liked it to be when it
dissolved in 1986.
But, at the same time, it exposed not only the Flick
Affair, but also other cases of influence peddling,
detailing how deep these practices had penetrated both the
bureaucratic (appointed) and elected branches of politics:
In the material of the fact-finding committee of 
the Bundestag one finds a lot of examples that
illustrate the network of connections between the 
Flick management and the civil service of the 
Ministries of Economics and Finance. One has the 
impression that civil servants that give 
information from inside the bureaucracy to a 
company like Flick are not the exception that
proves the rule of the rational character of
bureaucratic power in the sense of Max Weber. The 
Flick affair demonstrates developments in the 
bureaucratic power which used to be power by 
knowledge (34).
These findings may not have maintained strong public 
confidence towards the integrity of the institutions of
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state, but it made the electorate aware that the political 
system voluntarily aired its dirty laundry in public. If 
nothing else, this kind of response proved to the public 
that the Flick Committee of the Bundestag was making an 
attempt to expose and correct the corrupt practices that 
gave corporations excessive power in the political process.
In the end, the committee did make some recommendations as 
to drawing guidelines that would curb under the table 
exchanges of money for political favours.
But at the same time, the Bundestag did not respond 
legislatively to any of the suggestions made by the 
committee. Nor did the final report that was issued arouse 
any public interest: "The committee report, when published, 
aroused hardly any public interest, and none of the remedial 
measures that had been proposed were enacted" (35). The 
report released by the committee was quite harsh regarding 
the actions of politicians and political parties alike. It 
was "stressed that politicians of the CDU, the CSU, the FDP, 
as well as the SPD had made themselves too accessible to the 
requests of the Flick Corporation" (36), which was the focus 
of all the investigations.
There were those who voiced criticisms regarding the 
committee's lack of initiative. Otto Schily, the committee 
member from the Green Party was the most vocal critic of the 
committee's investigations. Knowing that all of the parties 
except his had been influenced by Flick, he questioned the
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integrity of the other committee members. Schily was of the
opinion that even the opposition party was negligent for not
actively pursuing all of the evidence; "The Greens'
representative on the commission commented sharply in a
dissenting report that even the SPD opposition had not
contributed actively enough in the process of clearing up
the factual findings" (37).
It is also interesting to note that Otto Schily felt
that the Flick Affair involved corruption. In his
dissenting report, Schily stated:
By means of donations the Flick Corporation has 
gained fields of influence systematically, so that 
it must be stated that political corruption on a 
large scale is involved, regardless of whether the 
punishable act of bribery or corruptibility has 
been realized in one or another case (38).
Schily was also of the opinion that the report issued by the
committee investigating the Flick affair was an attempt to
disguise what had actually happened to corrupt the system.
Schily “denounced as a cover-up the final report of the
all-party parliamentary investigative committee, which found
that Flick had failed in any attempts it may have made with
its donations to political parties" (39). In both the
committee report, and the dissenting report, the actions of
von Brauchitsch, and the politicians were condemned.
Although the committee was not willing to report that
corruption had actually taken place, it did acknowledge that
the Flick Corporation had gained too much influence within
all of the political parties.
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News organizations and the political system were both 
responsible and responsive in their treatment of the Flick 
Affair. Of course, sections of the media, especially the 
print media, benefitted from this by increasing the share of 
their market share when they reported on the activities of 
the Flick committee, and the state investigation. The 
political system also benefitted by giving an outward 
appearance of being concerned about such dealings. It 
recognized the inherent representative inequalities that 
such actions impose upon the political system, and suggested 
measures to try and stop such activities.
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Chapter Four: Compaiing Responses
The Public Inquiry into the Stevens Case
The Commission of Inquiry into the Facts and 
Allegations of Conflict of Interest Concerning the 
Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens (the Parker Inquiry), was 
established by Order in Council PC-1986-1139 of the Privy 
Council. Such public inquiries gain their authority from 
Part I of the Inquiries Act. On the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister, William Dickens Parker was appointed as the 
commissioner. The order was passed on May 15, 1988, 
entrusting Parker to inquire into and report on:
(a) the facts following allegations of conflict of 
interest made in various newspapers, electronic 
media and the House of Commons, with respect to
the conduct, dealings or actions of the 
Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens; and
(b) whether the Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens was in 
real or apparent conflict of interest as defined 
by the Conflict of Interest and Post Employment 
Code for Public Office Holders and the letter 
from the Prime Minister to the Honourable
Sinclair M. Stevens of September 9, 1985 (1).
With this, Parker had a mandate to conduct a full inquiry
into the allegations against Sinclair Stevens.
Hearings were held from July 1986 to February 1987.
Initially, the inquiry focused on five categories of
allegations of conflict of interest involving Stevens.
First there was the conflict with Magna. Second was the
conflict with two brokerage firms, which were awarded
72
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government contracts to sell shares in Crown Corporations 
being privatized, at the time when they were asked to help 
out York Centre. Third was the private dealings with Hanil 
Bank and the government's interactions with Hyundai. 
Fourth was that Stevens may have "mingled his private 
interest and the public interest" while he was a minister 
(2). Fifth, his blind trust was not blind as required by 
the Conflict of Interest Guidelines for Ministers of the 
Crown.
The Parker inquiry was one of the longest and most 
expensive inquiries commissioned by the federal government. 
Exact costs are not known because much of the commission was 
paid for by the Privy Council, which does not have to 
release figures on its expenditures. But it seems that the 
only conclusion that can be drawn about the inquiry, 
regardless of the criticisms it received, is that it was 
effective because it was able to uncover evidence that 
proved guilt.
The major reason behind the commission's success was 
the investigative work done by David Scott and his staff. 
If they had not discovered the diaries that Shirley Walker 
kept of Stevens's private affairs, many of the allegations 
made against Stevens could not have been substantiated. 
These diaries also led to further charges being brought 
against Stevens.
Parker's final assessment of the Stevens affair was
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that Stevens had been in violation of the conflict of
interest guidelines on a total of fourteen separate
occasions. Some of the initial allegations had to be
dropped either because of lack of evidence, or because there
was sufficient evidence that no conflict had ever existed.
It is important to mention that there is no need for an
actual conflict to exist in order to be convicted of
conflict-of-interest, and that the appearance of conflict by
a minister (apparent conflict) is as condemning. As Parker
stated: "I was directed to inquire into the facts following
these allegations and report on whether Mr. Stevens was in
real or apparent conflict of interest under the code of
conduct governing public office holders" (3).
What is interesting is that Parker, when discussing
apparent conflict, mentions that there may be differences in
each person's perception:
An appearance of conflict could thus exist even 
where there is no real conflict in fact. Real 
conflict requires, inter alia, knowledge on the 
part of the public office holder of the private 
interest that could be affected by his or her 
actions or inactions. No such actual knowledge is 
necessary for an apparent conflict because
appearance depends on perception (4).
Although this is only a minor point, it does become an issue
when discussing apparent conflict. Just because a member of
cabinet may not be aware that a conflict exists, members of
the media or the public may view actions as an actual
conflict, which can in turn harm the integrity of the
government.
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For the purposes of deliberation, Parker had to devise 
his own definitions of the ambiguous terms, real and 
apparent conflict of interest, which were agreed to by the 
prosecuting counsel and Stevens' lawyer. As specified by 
Parker, three conditions have to be met for real conflict of 
interest; 1) existence of a private interest; 2) the office 
holder is aware of the interest; 3) the connection with 
public duties is sufficient to influence those duties. As 
well, Parker determined that there does not have to be a 
divergence between public duty and private interests for a 
real conflict to exist. This test was left broad, because 
Parker felt:
if the need to show an actual decision conferring 
a benefit is to be required as part of the test
for conflict of interest, the test would be
narrowed down to what is already proscribed by our 
criminal law (5).
Parker placed a great deal of importance on the need to move
away from reliance on the criminal code, and wanted to
create a more stringent measure for public officials (6).
The formal definition that Parker settled on was:
A real conflict of interest denotes a situation in 
which a Minister of the Crown has knowledge of a 
private economic interest that is sufficient to 
influence the exercise of his or her public duties 
and responsibilities (7).
Parker's next task was to decide upon a working definition
of apparent conflict of interest. Again, Parker did not
want to impose the rule of law on guidelines, and he was
lenient in classifying an act as an apparent conflict.
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Apparent conflict would not include any decision made where 
a minister was unaware of the effects the decision would 
have had upon private holdings. In the end, Parker decided 
on this definition: "An apparent conflict of interest exists 
when there is a reasonable apprehension, which reasonably 
well-informed persons could properly have, that a conflict 
of interest exists" (8).
Parker stressed the importance of formulating these 
definitions at the end of the inquiry's public hearings. 
Each was decided upon in consultation with counsel from both 
sides, so some consensus was arrived at by the three parties 
involved. When the final report of the Inquiry was 
released, its findings of guilt were challenged by John 
Sopinka on the basis that Parker's definitions did not 
coincide with those arrived at by Sinclair Stevens. Parker 
was aware that these definitions had some shortcomings, and 
warned that they could only be applied to a situation after 
all of the facts have been collected, and that in certain 
circumstances they may have to be adjusted for as yet 
unforseen situations (9).
In the end, Parker found Stevens guilty of contravening 
the conflict of interest guidelines on at least fourteen 
separate occasions. First, there was Stevens' continued 
involvement with York Centre affairs. Testimony given by 
Mel Leiderman, the accountant for the York Centre group of 
companies, supported these charges. Leiderman admitted to
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the inquiry that Sinclair Stevens atteno5»3, and actively
participated in discussions about York Centre's financing
after he was appointed to cabinet. This led Parker to "find
that Mr. Stevens was present on both occasions not as a
casual observer providing background commentary Lut as an
individual who was vitally interested in the management of
his companies' (10).
Second, Parker dealt with the gold mining interest.
Again, Parker found that there was a conflict. Not only did
Stevens know about the attempt by York Centre to invest in
the gold play, but he initiated all of the contacts with
those that were trying to find financing for the project.
Parker further found:
that Mrs. Stevens kept Hr. Stevens fully informed 
as to the progress of the gold play and that M r . 
Stevens remained interested and involved as the 
initiative developed (11).
The third issue that Parker addressed was the Christ 
Coin proposal that York Centre was attempting to develop. 
The focus was on the meeting that Sinclair Stevens and his 
wife had with officials of the Chase Manhattan Bank. 
During that meeting, members of the bank brought up the 
issue of financing the coin while they were trying to secure 
contracts as government consultants. Both Mr. and Mrs. 
Stevens were in attendance at this meeting. Parker found 
this to be further evidence of conflict: "discussions and 
meetings revealed important evidence concerning the nature 
and extent of Mr. Stevens' involvement in private business
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matters while he was a Minister of the Crown" (12).
Parker also felt that Stevens was in violation of the 
conflict of interest code on a number of other occasions, 
such as when he privately solicited financial aid from 
members of the business community on behalf of his wife. As 
well, there were a number of major conflict of interest 
charges. These involved the loan from Anton Czapka, and 
Stevens' continued dealings with Magna International (13). 
Suspicion was also cast on Stevens' selection of board 
members to the CDIC. Board members represented business 
interests that Stevens approached for financing of York 
Centre; some of these members were in conflict of interest 
themselves because t.iey had to vote on privatization bids 
that were submitted by the private firms by whom they were 
employed (14).
Parker's Responses to the Stevens Affair
The federal government has made attempts to stop abuses 
of blind trusts, and avoid conflicts of interest by 
ministers. On the basis of federal reports and recent 
legislation passed by provincial governments, Parker offered 
some suggestions on how to reduce these problems. Borrowing 
from the 1984 Starr-Sharpe Report (Ethical Conduct in the 
Public Sector: Report of the Task Force on Conflict of
Interest), Parker suggested that all Cabinet ministers make
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full public disclosures before assuming executive duties.
He felt that this measure was necessary in order to enhance 
public confidence in the government's impartiality (15).
Stevens was under no obligation to make a public
disclosure of all holdings; most notable is the guidelines'
omission of listing controlled assets. A controlled asset
is defined as an "assets that could be directly or
indirectly affected as to value by Government decision or
policy" (16), placing a minister, or any legislator, in a
position to profit from decisions. Parker also found that
the guidelines which controlled conflict of interest lacked
strength in one important respect: there was no definition
of conflict of interest. It was only stated that a
minister should avoid such situations, and each minister
should have discerned these situations individually.
Another concern was the operation of a blind trust, which
Parker declared did not work in the case of Sinclair
Stevens. Parker saw no need for this measure in the future,
as it was an inadequate way of prohibiting a minister's
involvement in the management of a family business.
It was noted by Parker that a blind trust was
designed to distance the minister from his or her 
private business interests. There is no attempt 
to blind the minister to the existence of these 
business interests - indeed, the minister [was] 
informed of any material changes in the trust 
holding (17).
As this shows, Parker did not believe that a trust could 
perform the function it was designed to do, and that a full
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disclosure would do a more than adequate job in replacing 
it. Another point that Parker touched on was the position 
of a minister's spouse. He offered the suggestion that a 
full disclosure be made of the spouse's holdings because it 
is impossible for a minister to "ensure, first, that a 
spouse's activities do not create a conflict for the 
minister, and, secondly, that a spouse is not used as a 
vehicle to circumvent restrictions on the minister's 
behaviour" (18).
In response to Parker's suggestion of full public 
disclosures of assets, Mitchell Sharpe, one of the co­
authors of the Starr-Sharpe report said that "Disclosure 
will reveal potential conflicts of interest, but will do 
little to resolve them...It doesn't do anything to protect 
the public against the breaking of the rules" (19). More 
importantly, Sharpe felt that the best recommendation of the 
Starr-Sharpe Report was overlooked by Parker: the
foundation of an ethics commissioner. This commissioner 
would have the power to advise ministers of areas of real or 
potential conflict, and police their activities. However, 
Prime Minister Mulroney seemed quite enthusiastic about 
Parker's suggestions for reform. It was also during this 
time of renewed interest in the Stevens affair that Sinclair 
Stevens voiced his opposition to Parker's findings. And 
Stevens continued to contend that Parker was incorrect in 
his definitions of both actual and apparent conflict of
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interest.
The Flick Trial
After the Flick Committee of the Bundestag concluded 
its hearings, Hans Friderichs, Otto Graf Lambsdorff and 
Eberhard von Brauchitsch were tried by the Constitutional 
Court. Each was charged with tax evasion, bribery and 
corruption. The hearings drew to a close on February 16, 
1987. All three were found guilty of tax evasion, but the 
charges of bribery and corruption were dropped because of a 
lack of evidence. As the chief justice noted, it was too 
difficult to substantiate the charges of corruption because 
of the "poor memories on the part of witnesses" (20). All 
of the men received fines for their part in the Flick 
Affair, and von Brauchitsch was given a two year suspended 
sentence.
What the court found most reprehensible about the
entire affair was that it showed the inequalities that
existed in the West German political system. These
inequalities had affected the levels of influence that some
private citizens have with regard to the nation's
politicians and political parties:
West Germany's highest court stated on July 16 
1986 that there had been a 'violation of the 
citizen's right to an equal share in the political 
decision - making process' - equal to that 
exercised by those with large sums of money to 
dispose of. This must mean that it was believed-
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at the top - that Flick had tried to use his
wealth to exert pressure on politicians and that 
this 'violated' democratic norms (21).
The charges of corruption and bribery were dropped solely 
because of a lack of evidence. At no time did the court
question the legitimacy of these charges. According to the
judge, Hans Henning Buchholz, although the charges could not 
be substantiated, they were rightfully implied because money
had passed from von Brauchitsch to Friderichs and Graf
Lambsdorff: "It therefore seems reasonable to wonder - as 
did the Court - whether the lack of evidence truly meant 
that corruption had not been attempted" (22).
There were also the problems that arose with the
testimony of key witnesses at the trial. Of great
importance was that given by Rudolf Diehl, the chief book­
keeper for Flick industries. During the trial, Diehl "said 
he had sometimes written names of politicians next to Flick 
donations in a secret list without actually knowing they 
took the money" (23). Because of the prosecution's 
inability to confirm the information in the secret diaries, 
it was not possible to bring charges against all of the 
politicians listed in its pages.
In the past, the court had tried to eliminate these 
inequalities by striking down legislation that allowed those 
with large financial resources to donate as much money as
they wanted to parties and politicians, and in return,
receive a full tax credit for the amount of the
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contribution. Since the court had not previously allowed 
these pieces of proposed legislation to become law, it was 
quite logical for the court to follow these precedents when 
finding the three defendants guilty. The court wanted to 
help in the creation of a system where all Germans have 
equal access to, and representation from, those who possess 
political power.
Comparing Judicial Responses
The Parker inquiry had a more formidable task than that 
given to the Constitutional Court, since the Bundestag had 
established a committee which did most of the investigative 
work into allegations of secret funding from the Flick 
corporation. Parker's mandate left the inquiry with this 
responsibility in the Stevens case, as well as coming to a 
decision based on the evidence. Although the tasks varied, 
both judicial bodies had to proclaim either innocence or 
guilt in tho two cases. In each, a verdict of guilty was 
handed down.
Neither of these decisions found the men on trial 
guilty of corruption. However, the two judicial bodies did 
have reasons to find them so. West Germany's Constitutional 
Court was forced to dismiss all criminal charges of 
corruption because of lack of evidence. But it was clearly 
stated by the jurors that they determined the behaviour of
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the defendants had warranted the original charges. In the
Stevens case, Parker had to abide rigorously by his 
prescribed mandate to determine if Stevens had violated the 
conflict of interest code. Parker did not attempt to define 
the actions of the former minister as corrupt.
Nevertheless, Stevens' actions were found to be in
contravention of the Prime Minister's code. When Stevens' 
actions are placed in the context of the specified
definitional criteria, they can be considered corrupt in
that Stevens gave the appearance that he was mixing
government and private business.
In the written decisions, both judicial bodies sent 
strong messages to their respective legislatures, that more 
stringent rules for legislators had to be implemented so 
that these forms of illicit dealings would not become 
commonplace. Each decision contained a comprehensive list 
of amendments to existing codes that could accomplish the 
desired goals. The greatest weakness that the two forums 
shared was the inability to enforce the development of a 
more stringent code for legislators. Any recommendations 
were simply that; suggestions that the institutions could 
consider, but were under no obligation to include in current 
or future legislation.
One difference between the two outcomes - which could 
influence legislators' behaviour - is the ability to impose 
punishment on the convicted. As noted, the West German
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Ministers had to pay fines for accepting Flick money. 
Parker was only able to determine Stevens' guilt in terms of 
violating guidelines. Any form of punishment would be left 
to the House of Comr.ons or the Progressive Conservative 
party. It cannot be determined if thi_ fact has acted as a 
deterrent in West Germany or as a catalyst in Canada. But
if punishment does act as a deterrent, the results of the
Flick trial would have had a greater impact in terms of 
reducing abuses because Stevens was not penalized by the 
House of Commons.
Public Responses to the Case of Sinclair Stevens
The purpose of this section is to see what reaction the 
press had to the final report of the Parker inquiry. Judge 
Parker submitted the report to Prime Minister Mulroney on 
November 27, 1987, and it was tabled i.a the House of Commons
on December 3, 1987. In the case of Sinclair Stevens, mass
public opinion is extremely difficult to measure. Just 
prior to the release of the report, opinion polls showed 
that only 22% of Canadians supported the Progressive 
Conservative government, but its popularity was beginning to 
increase due to the popularity of the free trade deal that 
was being negotiated with the United States. By the fall of 
1988, Mulroney had assured himself a second term with a 
majority government. Instead, the most accurate way of
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formulating what mass public opinion may be is through 
examining the print media and its response to the final 
report.
The press seemed to be negative towards both the
government's existing conflict of interest rules that govern
a ministers actions, and towards the monetary expense
involved in the Parker inquiry. Much of the criticism the
press had was towards the guidelines Mulroney had developed
to govern ministers' behaviour. As Ross Howard mentioned:
In laying down his 1985 ethics package, Mr. 
Mulroney had rejected the urgings of a 1984 
parliamentary task force to create an ethics 
commissioner to advise on, administer and 
investigate potential conflict situations (24).
The parliamentary task force that Howard mentions is the
Starr-Sharpe committee that made recommendations regarding
what types of rules should be developed for a conflict-of-
interest code. Although there were criticisms regarding
Mulroney s less than effective guidelines, some reporters
took the opportunity to direct more pointed criticism at the
Prime Minister himself.
Jeff Sallot, a reporter with The Globe and Mail, took
the occasion of the commission's final report to criticize
Mulroney's staunch defence of the existing guidelines, which
were proven to be ineffective. Sallot stated:
in response to a barrage of questions from
opposition MPs about the Stevens case, Mr. 
Mulroney said his Government had the toughest
conflict-of-interest guidelines in any Western
democracy. Yesterday's report by Judge Parker
suggests Mr. Mulroney was wrong...His rhetoric has
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come back to haunt him once again (25).
The second focus of the press was the cost of the 
public inquiry. Only the costs of the hearing, and the bill 
submitted by David Scott had to be released publicly, the 
total of which was estimated to be approximately $3 million 
(26). Speculation had it that the bill submitted by John 
Sopinka, and his associates, for Stevens' defence came close 
to $650,000 (27). Exact figures were not disclosed because 
the bills were paid for by the Privy Council and are
therefore protected by Cabinet secrecy.
All of the renewed media attention surrounding the
Sinclair Stevens affair gave many members of Canada's 
political establishment an opportunity to comment on the 
affair, on Parker's recommendations, and on what should be 
done by Parliament to stop such conflicts from occurring in 
the future. Regarding the affair itself, Prime Minister 
Mulroney stated the day after Parker's report was tabled 
that "his government agrees with Parker's finding and 
concurs that the high standards Canadians expect of 
ministers "were not observed in this case" (28). Even th«s 
government was willing to admit that Stevens did not abide 
by the honour system or the Prime Minister's guidelines.
But this failing did not encourage the government to reform
the system.
With all of the renewed attention given the Stevens 
case upon the release of the Parker inquiry report, the
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former Minister made it clear that he did not agree with
Parker's decision. Stevens felt that Parker had misdefined
the conflict of interest guidelines that the Prime Minister
had issued to Ministers. Even though John Sopinka had been
consulted, and agreed to tiie commissioner's definition,
Stevens believed the inquiry would have found him innocent
if his definitions for real and apparent conflict had been
used. An interesting note is that Stevens never divulged
his definitions for real and apparent conflict of interest.
However, Stevens understood that the Prime Minister had no
other choice but to accept Parker's ruling on the basis of
Parker's definition. Definitional differences were also the
basis of Stevens'.appeal in the court system:
Sinclair Stevens announced yesterday [December 11,
1987] that he is appealing to the Federal Court of 
Canada to try to overturn the Parker commission's 
findings..Lawyers for Mr. Stevens said the review 
is being sought partly on the grounds that the 
judge erred in his definition of a conflict of 
interest (29).
With all of the criticism that the government received from 
the press and the opposition parties. Deputy Prime Minister 
Donald Mazankowski announced that the government would no 
longer be responsible for Stevens' legal bills.
Just three days after Stevens announced his appeal, he 
called another news conference. This time he attacked The 
Globe and Mail for what he felt was reporters stalking him, 
and making news, not reporting it. He also accused Geoffrey 
Stevens, the managing editor of The Globe and Mail, of
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celebrating the minister's guilt. Sinclair Stevens 
declared: "Do you think it is normal for the managing editor
of The Globe and Mail. the night that the Parker report
comes out, to throw a party and rejoicc at what he felt was 
a victory" (30). Geoffrey Stevens, no relation to the 
minister, immediately denied all charges made against him. 
He cited that there was no party held in his offices, and 
that if Sinclair Stevens had carefully read The Globe and 
Mail. he would realize that reporters also investigated the 
actions of other Cabinet ministers.
However, Stevens's accusation of being pursued by 
reporters, was not limited to The Globe and Mail. He and 
his wife both felt that they had been under the constant 
surveillance of the entire media when charges surfaced in 
Toronto newspapers. The couple felt that the renewed 
interest in the case in December of 1987 had caused the 
entire scenario to happen over again: "For four days last
May we felt like we were hostages. Once again we look out 
the window and there's the media" (31 :> • however, the media 
circus came to an end for the two with the resolution of the 
inquiry. All that remained of Stevens's political career 
was another eleven months as M P , culminating in the Prime 
Minister's refusal to sign Stevens' nomination papers for 
the 1988 election.
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The Public's Response to the Flick Affair
Although little has been written about the public (or
the electorate's) response to the Flick Affair in terms of
voting behaviour, some responses, and the political parties'
concerns towards the public's response can be noted. Since
only three parties are ever considered to be true coalition
builders, the Christian Democratic and Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the
Free Democratic Party (FDP), it is difficult to determine if
the electorate responded negatively towards these three
parties. The fourth party with Bundestag representation,
the Green Party, has only gained this representation during
the 1980s. Most perceived the electorate as being
indifferent to the corruption that was being investigated.
Public reaction
has been characterized by indifference rather than 
moral indignation... this may be explainable with 
some popular knowledge or belief, corresponding to 
everyday experience, that a certain degree of 
corruption - a certain degree of bending the 
rules - is needed to make li^e bearable in a 
bureaucratized and highly regulated world... 
public indifference may be attributed to a view 
that expects politicians to be corrupt anyway 
(32).
Responses by the political parties did not reflect the 
public's perceived attitude of indifference towards the 
political system. Members of all the parties, except the 
Greens, wanted to have the Flick Committee report brought 
down in advance of a Land (provincial) election.
The general consensus was that if the Bundestag's
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investigation continued, it could hurt the ability of the
three large parties to attract votes. Indeed, some
reporters believed that there was an initial sign of
negative voter response to the parties implicated in the
Flick affair. Evidence was provided by the Lander election
in Schleswig-Holstein, which coincided with Otto Schily's
allegations of perjury against Chancellor Kohl:
Some opinion polls suggest that in the wake of 
this announcement [allegations of per-iry] the 
Chancellor's personal popularity rating fell by 
exactly the same amount as the Christian 
Democratic vote has fallen in Schleswig-Holstein- 
some six percentage points (33).
However, this one result did not start a new pattern for
elections that took place while the Flick affair was still
in the headlines, and it did not seriously harm the
electoral draw of the three established parties.
Speculation had it that the public was not concerned
about the corrupt practices, because they were used to these
allegations being levelled at other public officials:
so far, the Flick affair has had less impact in 
West Germany than might have been expected. This 
is partly because allegations of receiving money 
illicitly have been levelled at various times 
against all the main parties, apart from the 
Greens (who were not around at the time) (34).
In some respects, it was never expected that any of the
former regulations governing party donations would have the
weight to curb unreported donations. This came as a result
of guidelines that had been labelled “restrictive and vague"
(35). Thus they allowed many precarious situations to occur
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because cash gifts could not easily be detected, and in some 
instances it was doubtful whether certain donations were 
illegal.
Ulrich von Alemann noted that the Flick affair acted as
a catalyst for public awareness, and caused "hot debate on
political corruption in the German public" (36). If this
was truly the case, it illustrates that there is not the
wide - spread acceptance of corruption that some claimed to
exist. Much of the credit for any heightened awareness goes
to the media that published details of the Flick Committee
findings, and to the proceedings of the Constitutional
Court. Ulrich von Alemann made a point of praising the
efforts made by members of the media to bring information
out into the open. He stated that; "In the 1980s corruption
has been a topic of 'muck-raking' by committed journalists
and by a few academic outsiders, but not by political
scientists" (37).
This point can be somewhat contradicted, even by Von
Alemann himself. He questioned whether much of the public
was concerned with corruption in the political system. The
argument behind this sentiment are election results, which
clearly show the public was not so discouraged by the
evidence of corruption that it would boycott the parties
implicated in the Flick affair:
Those parties, namely the CDU/CSU and the FDP, 
which profited most from illegal party donations, 
were able to win the federal parliamentary 
elections with a distinct majority at the climax
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of the scandal in spring 1983, and have been 
ruling since then without any contest. Only a 
minor critical part of the public reacted in a 
sensitive and alarmed way" (38).
Comparing Public Response
In West Germany and Canada the parties to which the 
accused Ministers belonged maintained their status as part 
of the governing coalition or the government. This ia 
peculiar in a number of respects. The first is that when 
the cases had been exposed to the general public, there was 
no noticeable disdain towards the politicians involved and 
the parties that they belonged to. Nor was there a notable 
decline in electoral support for the two political parties 
to which the three ministers belonged. Although polls did 
show a marked decline in voter support for the parties, this 
did not translate into lower levels of voter support when 
federal elections were held in each country.
The second result from the public exposure was a loss 
in trust of public officials. Of course there are those who 
never have, nor ever will trust politicians; but many people 
feel that the position of a Minister is one which should 
assist in the development of public trust towards the 
executive. Others believe that positions of authority allow 
politicians, considered to he unscrupulous, an opportunity 
to gain private benefits for performing their prescribed 
duties. A breakdown in trust can then occur because those
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who do not possess financial resources, realize that they 
cannot command similar levels of representation as those 
with wealth. Skepticism of this magnitude would normally
indicate that the electorate would want to change their 
party preference by the next election.
Of course the German and Canadian publics were angered
by what was exposed in the press, but the press did not
publish information regarding public outcry for new 
legislation. The media may not have found this necessary,
and that public expression of disapproval was a strong 
enough sign to the political elites that the public wanted 
rules guiding legislators' behaviour made more restrictive. 
Or it could have been that there was no public demand for 
legislative reform, just that the three ministers were 
punished by the judicial system. And because of the limited 
media coverage after the cases had been resolved, it cannot 
be determined how the public regarded the legislative 
responses that were taken.
Elite public response (academics and the media) also 
showed signs of disapproval towards the actions of the 
ministers. As well, they were irate towards the 
legislatures, which in the past did little to legislate 
against abuses, nor did these bodies respond to the requests 
of the judiciary to reform codes. The Canadian news media 
took advantage of the limited government response to the 
Parker inquiry report to criticize the Prime Minister's
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endless defence of existing codes. Both the media and the 
general public let the events slide, seemingly forgetting 
about the allegations shortly after they were resolved.
Cases such as these have generated renewed interest on 
the part of academics in both countries towards work in the 
field of political corruption. Some skepticism has been 
voiced toward these academic responses, with criticism 
focusing on the fact that attention would be given to a case 
when it was in the public eye, but their interest would fade 
when corruption was not a fashionable topic. The attention 
given these two cases after they had been resolved refutes 
this hypothesis. Work has continued to concentrate on what 
has or has not been done by the respective legislatures.
How Can Conflicts Be Stopped in Canada
It has been commented that "conflict of interest rules 
may be regarded as nothing more than cumbersome regulations 
which promote the... search for loopholes" (39). In 
actuality, codes are devised to aid public officials in the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest. One area that must be 
addressed by guidelines is that of "personal economic 
interests„..which substantially affect the independence of 
the legislator" (40). No matter how much legislation is 
enacted there will still be some areas where discretion will 
be required.
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A valid argument can be made for the necessity of 
guidelines governing the conduct of ministers in Canada. 
These "rules against conflict of interest can be deduced 
from the principle that decisions made about the application 
and administration of the law should be made impartially" 
(41). Impartiality must be the overriding principle to be 
followed, and the basis for this can be found in both the 
rule of law and the bounds of social equality. Essentially, 
this part of the doctrine of fairness which prescribes
"decision makers shall not be in a position whereby they 
could favour people who are currently or were recently 
closely associated with them" (42). Simply put, rules 
would require ministers themselves to avoid conflicts of 
interest, and remain neutral when making decisions. Since 
the Sinclair Stevens affair, the Canadian government has 
initiated two pieces of legislation with stringent 
regulations.
The Members of the Senate and House of Commons Conflict 
of Interest Act (Bill C-114), was first introduced February 
24, 1988. This legislation has three main sections. First 
is an annual declaration of assets by members of the Senate 
and the Commons. It also required spouses and all dependent 
children to file declarations. This would ensure that
conflicts would not arise because of any family members' 
assets. It also means that direct family members could not
take control of a Member of Parliament's assets.
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Second, the legislation calls for the establishment of 
an independent three-member commission. The commission 
would perform a number of functions. One of the roles would 
be an advisory one - letting parliamentarians know which 
holdings they should divest themselves of. They would also 
make sure that all officials and their families fill out the 
necessary public declarations of assets. The final function 
would be to initiate investigations into any alleged 
misconduct. As can be seen from this brief discussion about 
the commission, its main purpose is to act in an advisory 
capacity, trying to help members avoid conflicts, and not to 
try and prosecute anyone needlessly.
Third, the legislation established penalties for non- 
compliance. These penalties ranged from fines, to members 
losing their seats. In November 1988, Prime Minister
Mulroney called an election, and Bill C-114 died on the 
Order Paper. Since then. Bill C-46, which shares its full
title with Bill C-114 has been proposed. Introduced on 
November 9, 1989, Bill C-46 was essentially the same as its
predecessor.
Even though the Stevens case illustrates the need for 
such comprehensive codes, there has been one group 
particularly adamant in its rejection of Bill C-114. This 
group was the spouses of high ranking Members of Parliament. 
Generally, it was felt that this type of legislation was an 
invasion of privacy and was against the constitutional
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rights of spouses and dependents. To protest the
legislation, spouses started a letter campaign against the 
bill. It cannot be determined whether or not this campaign 
was responsible for the demise of the proposed legislation, 
but it may have been a convenient way of disguising the true 
goals of the elected officials. Keeping this in mind, it 
remains to be seen if Bill C-46 will become law.
Both of these bills contained measures which Parker
suggested be included in any ethics code to regulate MPs.
Most importantly, they both had provisions for public 
disclosures of assets by members, their spouses and 
dependent children. Through initiation of a process of 
public disclosures, any policy adopted by the House of
Commons would be more effective because it would promote 
public vigilance. In turn, this should make Members of 
Parliament more conscientious about taking appropriate 
measures to ensure their actions conform to the governing
guidelines (43). However, there are some reasons against a 
stringent code of conduct for all MPs, and there are those 
who feel that backbenchers should not have to be restrained 
by the same codes as Ministers because of the limited power 
they possess.
At the extreme, there is the belief that the existing 
rules already serve their function well. Of course there is 
the problem that conflict of interest remains undefined, so 
that "it became obvious that the unwritten code of conduct
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was being interpreted in widely divergent ways, leading to 
unresolved internal disputes over standards" (44). Another 
reason for not developing a more stringent code is that 
"corruption in Canada has been rare; these cases that have 
arisen have been dealt with satisfactorily” (45),
There are two faults in this logic: first, rarity does 
not make an activity legitimate. The fact that only a few 
cases have been disclosed does not mean that the problem is 
limited in scale. As well, the process of dealing with the 
abuses is costly and time consuming, and the penalties given 
to Graf Lambsdorff, Friderichs and Stevens were minimal, so 
they do not act as effective deterrents.
It has been argued by our elected representatives that 
we should have faith in the integrity and honour of the HP 
to observe existing rules and unwritten codes. Evidence of 
this is given by Canadian Members of Parliament themselves, 
as can be seen in a study conducted by Michael Atkinson and 
Maureen Mancuso. Legislators consider a written code 
redundant (46). This paper challenges this claim on the 
basis that Stevens knowingly broke the few regulations he 
was committed to observe. At the other end of the spectrum, 
some hold that codes cannot "anticipate those types of 
wrongdoing which are not strictly criminal" (47). The 
problem with this logic is that there are wrongdoings that 
can be regulated, and violations that were not anticipated 
by such a code can be dealt with when they occur.
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One of the traditional arguments against strict rules 
is that successful business people want to keep track of 
their private holdings, so a stringent code will act as a 
deterrent to these people who might otherwise consider 
entering politics. Most provinces have codes as strict, or 
more restrictive than either Bill C-46 or C-114, and are 
still able to attract qualified candidates from the private 
sector. If MPs are financially secure, the next line of 
reasoning goes, they are less likely to be influenced by 
outside forces. The final argument is that backbench MPs 
should not be held to the same rules that cabinet Ministers 
have to adhere to. It is believed that these MPs have 
little influence in the decision-making process, and 
therefore do not need as stringent regulation as Members of 
the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister did review existing guidelines 
during his first year in office, making few changes. 
Instead of enacting legislation that would empower the court 
system to deal with conflicts of interest, Mulroney opted to 
establish a Code of Conduct. By doing so, any violation 
would be dealt with through a public inquiry which does not 
carry the same authority as a court of law. While 
considering amendments to the code of conduct, it had been 
suggested to the Prime Minister that an ethics commissioner 
(called an ethics czar' by Erik Nielsen), be appointed to 
ensure that the code was being enforced, and all MPs were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
complying with it. However, this was swiftly dismissed by 
the Deputy Prime Minister who was aware that the Prime 
Minister wanted "to retain accountability and the capacity 
to exercise his political judgement on conflict sanctions" 
(48).
There is a history to the conflict of interest letters 
issued by Prime Ministers. Lester Pearson was the first to 
do so, writing a simple warning to ministers that their 
actions should bear the closest public scrutiny. Pierre 
Trudeau expanded on Pearson's original letter. New
requirements made ministers file full disclosures of non­
personal assets, and brought about the establishment of 
blind trusts. In 1974 the office of Assistant Deputy 
Registrar General was created to ensure compliance with the 
guidelines.
When Joe Clark was elected, he kept the basic 
guidelines issued by Trudeau, but made them more
restrictive. Under these new rules, Clark also required 
ministers' spouses and dependent children to fill out full 
disclosures, and for the first time, the guidelines were 
made public. Supposedly, public knowledge of the guidelines 
would encourage Members of Parliament to fully comply with 
them. After the short - lived Clark government, Trudeau 
again adjusted the rules governing legislators by removing 
the provisions regarding spouses and dependent children 
submitting disclosures. As tradition seemed to dictate.
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Mulroney formulated his own conflict of interest code.
Legislative Response to the Flick Affair
Laws on party financing in West Germany have existed 
since the writing of the Basic Law in 1949, and have been 
revised from time to time to stop abuses of the system. 
Fifteen years before the Flick affair was exposed, there had 
been an attempt to reform party financing in West Germany in 
what came to be know as The 1967 Party L a w . Section 4 
allowed all parties that received a minimum of 2.5% of the 
votes in an election to receive $1.49 for each vote to
recover campaign costs. This amount was raised to $2.09 in
1979, and $2.98 in 1986 (49). The purpose of this law was
to reduce the necessity for political parties to rely on
illegally obtained donations as was the case with von 
Brauchitsch. It was also the intention of the legislation 
to reduce the reliance on large donations from wealthy 
individuals or corporations.
In order for the 1967 law to meet constitutional 
requirements of Section 21 of the Basic Law (see Appendix I, 
p . 151), it had to include some regulations that would force 
all parties to account for their sources of income. Section 
5 of the legislation contained this clause so that all 
donations to political parties would be reported, thereby 
eliminating hidden contributions. Full disclosures would be
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required to be made for any donations by individuals in 
excess of $11,916 and $119,160 by corporations. As well, 
these donors would not be able to deduct more than $357 from 
their taxes for donations of any amount (50). These 
disclosures would expose those that donate large sums to 
parties and politicians, and thereby lessen the 
representational inequalities previously allowed by such 
donations, as fewer would find it advantageous to give large 
amounts.
Even though some measures had been taken well before 
Flick had been exposed, secret funding continued to plague 
the West German political culture. This practice became 
known as Umwegfinanzierung. The term referred to the 
practice of illegal donations because “businessmen and 
corporations were not interested in being named in the 
[party] reports' (51). An example of the illegal funding 
can be seen by a close examination of the CDU. The party 
had established the European Business Consulting Firm which 
was located in the neighbouring country of Liechtenstein. 
For all intents and purposes, this firm was nothing more 
than a clearing house for tax deductible party 
contributions. This firm would write reports for
corporations and individuals at a minimum cost of $5,958, 
for which a tax receipt would be issued. In turn, the 
consulting firm donated all of the money it received to the 
CDU.
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Another method of securing further secret funding is 
through party education groups. All parties have
established public political education foundations, to which 
tax deductible contributions can be made. These foundations 
would in turn give substantial monetary gifts to their 
associated parties each year, which meant that the actual 
contributors would never be exposed. Both of these methods 
of soliciting contributions are examples of how "parties 
were interested in obtaining more funds, if necessary, by 
engaging in illegal practices to grant the contributors tax 
deductions" (52). By 1978, 105 firms had been charged on 
suspicion of tax fraud for their donations to the CDU (53).
Renewed attention was given to financing problems by 
the Bundestag because of the publicity that the Flick Affair 
generated, and some legislation was drawn up in response to 
this. However, it is important to mention that the 
legislation that was introduced did not try to restrict the 
amounts that either individuals or corporations could donate 
to politicians or political parties. These virtually 
unlimited donations, which could be made under the
legislation, would have been fully tax deductible. It
cannot be honestly said that it was the Flick Affair that
brought about this type of legislation regarding financial 
donations. Other attempts had previously been made to 
achieve the same objective, and in each case, the
legislation heavily favoured those with money.
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The final legislation, called the Party Finance Laws of
22 December, 1983, was approved by the constitutional court
in July, 1988, with some minor changes. And,
To the surprise of many observers, the court 
upheld almost all of the new provisions, and where 
the court did act against the laws as predicted, 
its judgement was far more generous than almost
anyone had expected (54).
The change that the court made was the 5% clause included by
the parties. In essence, this clause would allow an
individual or corporation to donate up to 5% of their annual
income to the political parties, which would be fully
eligible for a tax deduction. For the court, this clause
was the only objectionable part of the law. The court
stated that, "on constitutional grounds for
disproportionally favoring high income earners" (55), it
would not allow that solitary clause. Instead, the court
suggested a maximum donation of $59,580 annually. It is
easy to see from this that the courts acquiesced to the
political parties because the average German income at the
time was $23,832 (56).
As well, this decision reversed what the court had 
earlier tried to accomplish, because each of the
subsidiaries of a corporation could donate up to $59,580. 
When the parties had previously tried to pass a similar bill 
the courts always struck them down, using the same argument 
as they did when they finally let the legislation pass: "The 
judges said that the original figure 'violated the citizen's
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right to an equal share in the decision-making process', 
thus implicitly accepting the obvious truth that Flick had 
bought political influence" (57). The main reason why the 
$59,530 cap was placed on the donations was that political 
parties were not public interest groups.
Public interest groups can receive donations of any 
amount, and in return the donor can receive a full tax 
credit :
the constitutional court had repeatedly (in 1958,
1968, and again in 1979) ruled out this 
possibility, drawing repeated distinctions between 
public interest organizations (which do not have 
legislative authority or participate in the 
exercise of state power) and political parties 
(which have both of these) (58).
Although the courts had more or less allowed those with
greater financial resources the ability to give much more in
terms of donations, and allow these people, or corporations,
to get tax credits, they did not allow political parties to
define themselves as anything but political parties. In
effect, this limited the parties' ability to receive
unlimited contributions from donors.
As mentioned earlier, there was also the increase in
the election reimbursement funds. All parties received
$2.98 for each vote that they gained in an election. Prior
to 1988, a party had to get 5% of the total vote to have
election expenses returned; however, the court felt that
this level should be reduced to one half of a per cent. By
increasing the amounts parties retrieved for their costs, it
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was less likely that a party would have to rely on private 
donations. Also, this higher level of funding was to serve 
as a vehicle to promote equity between all political
parties.
Party financing had risen at a rate higher than 
inflation, which may have encouraged the series of hidden 
contributions. Because of the political competition, each 
party had to be able to spend at similar levels, which meant 
parties became more competitive for scarce financial 
resources. It was assumed that by increasing amounts of 
available public funding, parties could then reduce their 
reliance on private funding. It was known that financial 
"reforms may not end the pressure for parties to keep up
financially with their competitors, but they may lessen the
likelihood that this pressure will lead to abuse of the 
political process' (59). This decision by the court
illustrates that it was sensitive to the monetary needs of 
the parties, while trying to preserve the constitutional 
premise of equality in representation which was not present 
with parties accepting large contributions.
In essence, it can be said that the constitutional 
court finally gave in to the demands of the political 
parties: "The persistent noncompliance with existing legal 
rules had finally paid off" (60). Blackenburg also stated 
that, "it is plain to see that the court has in fact 
sanctioned the practice that parties had employed illegally
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in the past, blatantly contradicting its own former 
jurisprudence" (61). In other words, the court legalized 
the corrupt practices it had formerly judged illegal. The 
large donations that were not allowed in the past became 
acceptable with the judgement; therefore, the court helped 
in perpetuating the inequalities that existed prior to the 
Flick affair, although previously illegal. Other areas of 
financing were also recognized by the new law.
An attempt was made in these laws to warn parties and 
politicians alike to avoid certain donations. This was 
actually presented in the form of a list that accompanied 
the laws. Included in this list of donations that
recipients should be wary of, were those "from any source 
that indicates expectations of political or economic 
favoritism" (62). Although common sense would dictate to 
avoid these contributions, the list, which appears to be 
somewhat simplistic, may be necessary to assist in 
prosecuting future corruption cases. It acts as another 
provision that must be abided.
Some measures were taken to impose penalties on parties 
that were recipients of non-reported donations. Most 
notably is that if a party does not report a contribution, 
it may have to pay a fine of twice the donated amount to the 
President of the Bundestag. A number of difficulties could 
be encountered in the implementation of the newly announced 
laws and their penalties. If a donation goes unreported.
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this is probably because neither the recipient nor the donor 
want the amounts publicized, and there are no prescribed 
methods of uncovering these transactions, unless, as was the 
case with the Flick affair, investigators stumble across
records that would confirm suspicions.
There is also the problem of determining how much money
was involved in an uncovered exchange. Again, if the
amounts are not reported, there must be a reason for it. It
would be likely that in these instances, there may not be a
diary containing amounts and recipients that prosecutors
could use. Since cases may be hard to substantiate, these
sanctions may all prove to be in vain.
Of all the legislative action taken in response to the
Flick affair there is one piece that is particularly
interesting and the most controversial. In 1984 there was
an attempt to pass legislation that would grant amnesty to
all corporations and individuals that were being
investigated for contributions that might have led to
political favours. But, the legislation eventually had to
be dropped because of strong public opposition (63):
the FDP and the CDU/CSU, [tried] to grant an
'amnesty' to individuals and firms under
investigations for illegal political
contributions, [which] failed when the Free
Democrats, reacting to intense media and voter
criticism, withdrew their support (64).
If nothing else, this illustrates how the political parties
have, whenever possible, tried to protect themselves
financially, and their donors legally. Even though the
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parties were not able to protect those who donated illegally 
through existing or proposed legislation, they have insured 
themselves unlimited funding in the future. As well, they 
have insured those with wealth, greater access to political 
power through the new legislation.
The court's decision to support the new Party Law was 
not unanimous. Two justices in their dissenting opinion 
stated that the court was instrumental in “ [smoothing] the 
way for individuals or groups having specific interests and 
big capital to exert influence on the development of 
political opinion in combination with tax-relief" (65). Two 
dissenters obviously were not enough to carry the court 
against the new legislation, but they demonstrate the 
existence of a core of resistance towards easing the rules 
that govern political donations. Clearly it is in the 
favour of parties to have non-restrictive guidelines, but 
the court could either continue on its present course of 
loosening such laws, or it may revert back to its more 
traditional stance of strict regulatory laws.
Comparing Legislative Responses
For the purposes of comparison, legislative responses 
constitute the most interesting section. The House of 
Commons in Canada, and the Bundestag in West Germany were 
both placed in the unenviable position of having ministerial
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misconduct publicly exposed. At the same time, the cases 
provided the two legislatures with the perfect opportunity 
to adopt new and comprehensive legislation to keep these 
embarrassments from happening in the future. Instead of 
capitalizing on these occasions to initiate reform, the 
legislatures let the opportunities pass, deciding to 
restrict any legislation's effectiveness for governing 
legislator's behaviour, and little has been done to 
incorporate judicial suggestions.
One obvious difference in the two legislatures is that 
the Bundestag did pass legislation after the Flick affair 
was resolved in the court system. But it did not address 
the problems created in the political system by secretive 
campaign contributions. Before any proposed bill could 
become law, it had to pass the scrutiny of the
Constitutional Court. Here, the weaknesses of the
legislation were criticized. The judges found in the bill
the legalization of formerly illegal campaign 
contributions. Precedent would have dictated that the Court 
not allow the proposed legislation to become law. When the 
Court decided that the legislation would stand, with the 
exception of the maximum donation clause, it knowingly gave 
in to the long standing desire of the political parties.
Recognizing the shortcomings of the legislation, and 
inability to legislate in place of the Bundestag, the Court 
issued its decision fully aware that high caps for maximum
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donations would only serve to entrench representative
inequalities. Of course there was also the introduction of
the notorious amnesty legislation which did not make it
through the Bundestag because of strong public opposition to 
it. Considering the Court's objection to the bill that had 
already been passed, it would be unlikely that it would have 
allowed the amnesty bill. However, the mere fact that the 
Bundestag introduced such a bill illustrates how lightly it 
takes such infractions, and the willingness of political 
parties to protect donors.
The House of Commons has not yet passed any new
conflict of interest legislation. Since the resolution of 
the Stevens case, two conflict of interest bills have been 
introduced in Parliament. Neither have been adopted; the 
first failed with an election call in 1988, and the second 
is currently proceeding through the legislative system. 
What separates the Canadian effort from the West German is 
that the Canadian legislation did address the problems found 
in the Stevens case. Both pieces of legislation called for 
Ministers to make full public disclosures of their assets, 
and gave the legislature the power to enforce penalties on 
those found in violation.
The penalties which could be imposed ranged from fines 
to expulsion. As well, legislating a code of ethics would 
mean violations would be heard in a court of law. These 
sections of the legislation were suggested both by Parker
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and the earlier Starr-Sharpe report. What each neglected 
was the establishment of an ethics commission, which would 
act as both a watchdog and a consulting body that MPs could 
approach if they were not certain whether an action complied 
with guidelines. If Bill C-46 makes it through the 
legislative process, it would clearly represent a more 
comprehensive effort to abolish conflicts. Failure to pass 
any such legislation will mean that there are no checks on a 
Minister's behaviour beyond the Prime Minister's letter and 
the conflict of interest code.
These two responses are divergent in that the Bundestag 
responded quickly to calls for reform by proposing two 
pieces of legislation. In Canada, the House of Commons has 
successfully avoided the passage of any new legislation. 
What the two legislative bodies have in common is an effort 
to avoid restrictive legislation, a behaviour which displays 
a level of complacency towards the discovered abuses. This 
is not to say that legislators accepted the abuses of their 
colleagues, but obviously felt there was no need to respond 
to the legislative weaknesses that allowed the abuses to 
occur in the first place. Clearly the judicial bodies that 
heard the two cases would be disappointed by these 
responses. Although the actions of Stevens, Graf Lambsdorff 
and Friderichs have not been legalized within either system, 
nothing has been done to outlaw them.
Without passage of either of these bills, the House of
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Commons will display the same complacency as the Bundestag. 
Failure to pass C-46 will not result in an acceptance of 
Ministers placing themselves in situations of conflict in 
terms of private influence over legislative decisions, which 
the Bundestag effectively did with the passage of the newest 
election financing laws. However, failure to adopt more 
restrictive guidelines will mean that there are insufficent 
checks on a Minister's behaviour.
Sinclair Stevens Conclusion
For the Canadian political culture, the Sinclair 
Stevens case displayed the weaknesses inherent in the 
conflict of interest guidelines. It exposed the willingness 
of a Minister of the Crown to abuse his position of public 
trust in an attempt to save his private business, with which 
he was to have nothing to do under existing conflict of 
interest rules. From the evidence that was brought forward, 
and on the basis of the decision of Chief Justice Parker, it 
appears that some of the people that aided Stevens 
benefitted in return.
On the basis of the evidence, there are two groups 
which lost because of the incident. First, there is the 
public, who may have lost whatever faith they did have in 
the honesty and integrity of cabinet ministers. The 
electorate expects cabinet ministers to possess both of
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these qualities. It may also have reduced the confidence 
the public had in the government as a whole; however, this 
is not supported by the subsequent election results. The 
next election was held in November of 1988, a year and a 
half after the Parker inquiry ended, and it is clear from 
the majority of constituencies that the 'regressive 
Conservative party won, the Stevens case was only a minor 
part of party choice, if it played any role at all. The 
other group that lost were other industries that had 
legitimate need for money from Stevens' ministry, money that 
may have instead gone to Magna Industries.
There are two interesting end notes to the Sinclair 
Stevens affair. One is that Stevens could, and did appeal 
the decision of the Parker Inquiry (66). Since the Parker 
Inquiry was a public commission, it had no legal or 
political jurisdiction, it was not able to impose any 
penalties on Stevens. It was only able to render a decision 
regarding his guilt or innocence.
As well, Stevens did attempt a comeback in the
political arena. In July of 1988, Stevens was nominated by 
the York-Simcoe Progressive Conservative riding association 
to be the candidate for the November election of that year. 
A month before the election. Prime Minister Mulroney 
announced that he would refuse to sign Stevens' nomination 
papers, citing: "Public confidence in the political process 
and in the candidates who offer themselves for public office
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is essential. In my view, Mr. Stevens' candidacy would be 
inconsistent with that requirement" (67).
What Sinclair Stevens did was unprincipled, violating a 
code that he should have been familiar with. It can be 
speculated what would have happened if the case had taken 
place in West Germany, it would probably have received far 
less attention than it did in Canada. If the case had 
involved a high ranking member of the executive, the media 
may have spent some time investigating and reporting the 
incident, although it would not have afforded the case the 
same intense scrutiny as the Canadian media gave it. This 
conclusion is based on the fact that Stevens placed no 
conditions on the government funds he was in a position to 
distribute, so benefits could not have been a pre-condition 
for funding, especially in relationship to Magna 
Corporation. Considering the large number of cases of 
unreported campaign contributions that have been exposed in 
Germany, an incident of a minister acquiring aid for his own 
business pales in comparison to the influence Flick had 
acquired. Most likely, the Stevens case would have been 
viewed as a benefit that a ministerial post grants its 
occupant.
Presumably, public response would be even less notable 
than that of the media. Germans seem to have a built in 
suspicion regarding the integrity of their elected 
officials, as is made evident by the limited public response
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towards the allegations of the Flick affair. Politicians 
are viewed as willing to use their power in order to benefit 
themselves, and in the Stevens case, there never was a 
question of creating representational discrepancies among 
the general public. Any decision made by Stevens' ministry 
would only affect wealthy corporations. So any corporation 
that would want its bid considered in the privatization 
process would be aware they would need to pay for this 
consideration. A large majority of private citizens would 
not be involved in the bidding for these companies, 
regardless, it illustrates that most citizens could lose
authority in the political system if payment is required for 
consideration of a request made of a legislator.
In terms of legislative response, this is the area of 
the greatest discrepancy. When it was found that von 
Lambsdorff and Friderichs accepted large cash donations on 
behalf of the FDP from the private sector, the Bundestag 
took measures that increased the limits of funding allowed. 
It in no way addressed the issue of a private citizen 
receiving extra-ordinary considerations because of the
donations. This is not to suggest that legislation would
require a bid on a government contract be accompanied by a 
gift for the official in charge of granting such work. This
would be a private condition attached by the minister
him/herself. But it does prompt a conclusion that no
legislative reform would be taken to counteract such
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behaviour, regardless of whatever the Constitutional Court 
might decide.
Flick Affair Conclusion
Although the West German political culture may regard 
the Flick Affair as a simple scandal, it goes far beyond 
being a scandal; corruption did occur. For the most part, 
evidence shows that Flick was willing to use his financial 
clout in order to guarantee himself favours that could only 
be secured through the misuse of legislative or executive 
powers. As well, public officeholders were willing to abuse 
their authority in order to obtain private financial 
benefits. Both sides involved in this corrupt act 
benefitted financially, and the only ones to lose out were 
the people without enough financial resources to command 
similar benefits.
The constitutional court did recognize this 
discrepancy, and tried to rectify it on a number of previous 
occasions, but the parties and politicians allowed it to 
persist by continuing to accept large donations without 
reporting them. If there was any decrease in the numbers of 
illegal contributions, the credit for this has to be given 
to the media. As Arthur Gunlicks noted that due to "the 
recent negative publicity and prosecutions concerning 
donations, large contributors had become a rare species in
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Germany" (68), which illustrates the effectiveness of 
public exposure. There seemed to be little else that would 
reduce the large sums that individuals and corporations 
would give to parties and politicians, often in return for 
receiving illegitimate representation.
Count Lambsdorff and Friderichs may represent only a 
small proportion of ministers of finance involved in 
receiving cash donations for their party. On a number of 
occasions.
Investigations by lower-level officials and tax- 
inspectors [into tax fraud] were usually stopped 
at an early stage by political interventions 'from 
above'. Not infrequently, ministers of finance 
(being responsible for the investigation of tax 
fraud) were former party-treasurers (the ones who 
stood most to gain from illegal practices of 
party financing) (69).
Had these investigations been allowed to continue, they most
assuredly would have been damaging to the minister of
finance, and other high ranking political figures. Having
the authority to suspend investigations, and not have these
decisions undermined when such powers were used, the
ministers were able to minimize the political damage. This
executive interference does lead to one question, how many
more German corporations, or wealthy individuals, and
politicians would have been tainted besides those in the
Flick affair?
What is truly interesting in this investigation is the 
response of the Bundestag, or lack of response. Instead of 
trying to limit large donations from a single source.
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legislation was drawn up that would legalize them, so that 
these transactions would no longer have to be concealed. 
And the court, although not willingly, ga\ 3 in to the wish 
of the legislature to make funding more accessible. In 
essence, the discrepancies in the political buying power of 
the public that existed before in the German political 
culture had become institutionalized. In terms of public 
standards, it would seem that none had been broken by Flick. 
Due to the high cost of financing a campaign, secret funding 
has become expected by the West German public, and a 
necessity for the political parties. There is nothing to 
show strong public resentment towards those people or 
corporations that may seek special considerations on the 
basis of monetary donations to the political elite.
If the Flick affair was put into the context of the 
Canadian political system, it would definitely be considered 
a real conflict of interest. Cash donations given directly 
to a minister could not be mistaken for anything else but 
bribery, which would be in direct contravention of the Prime 
Minister's guidelines. An infraction such as bribery would 
be a violation of the Canadian criminal code, as it is in 
West Germany, and as such would be tried in a court of law. 
Unlike with the Stevens case, it is doubtful that ministers 
implicated in bribery would be allowed to continue 
representing their party in the House of Commons, where 
Stevens was staunchly defended. This conclusion is arrived
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at because Canada is the same country where a defense 
minister, Robert Coates, had to resign for being discovered 
in a West German night spot, with a woman of questionable 
character seated on his lap, and leaving his briefcase 
behind with government documents.
A case of the Flick affair's magnitude may have even 
forced the House of Commons to respond to such acts by not 
only introducing new legislation tightening up provisions 
for ministers to follow, but by actually passing such a 
bill. The public response would probably be far more 
condemning of a case of bribery than they were towards 
Stevens' conflict of interest. However, it is not evident 
as to whether a public call for reforms would persist over 
time, or dissolve soon after the judiciary came to a 
decision of guilt or innocence regarding the minister's 
actions.
Media response would be as strong, if not stronger in a 
case of bribery than it was in the case of Stevens. In 
Canada, the media has adopted the role of watchdog over 
parliamentarians, and did a worthy job of gathering evidence 
against Stevens. Since bribery would be considered a 
greater offence, the medis. would most likely be more 
persistent at insisting the government amend and strengthen 
conflict of interest codes. In all, a Canadian response to 
the Flick affair would be more condemning and direct than 
that taken in West Germany. The government would have to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
respond in a forceful way to ensure ministers do not act on 
legislative requests from the private sector because they 
were accompanied by money.
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Conclusion
Evidence from the two cases does make them appear 
dissimilar at first. This is because the Flick affair is a 
clear case of bribery. On the other hand, the Stevens case 
initially involved normal associations between a minister 
and members of the corporate elite, interactions that 
carried over into personal business interests, creating a 
conflict of interest. In the Flick affair, corruption was 
initiated by a private citizen, while in the Stevens case it 
was initiated by a member of the executive. Regardless of 
these differences a comprehensive comparison can be carried 
out. Of utmost importance is that these two cases grant an 
opportunity to examine both the judicial and legislative 
responses to corrupt actions, as the transgressions did 
become public knowledge.
Apparently, few cases of corruption of the magnitude of 
Flick or Stevens are exposed. The reason for this must lie 
somewhere within these three excuses; these actions are rare 
occurrences within a political culture; cases that are 
discovered are usually dealt with quietly by the 
institution(s) where they occurred; or governments lack the 
willingness or ability to discover, and bring forward, 
evidence to prove a case, and eventually come to a 
resolution. Recently, questionable political practices have 
been receiving more attention by the media, as can be seen
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at both the federal and provincial levels in Canada, and 
academics are giving serious consideration to the study of 
such cases. This in turn may encourage a reaction from the 
mass public, which presumably should not tolerate this form 
of behaviour from the officials they have elected to public 
office.
Below the surface, there are many points of similarity 
between the two cases. A decision in the Stevens case came 
a little more than a year after the West German
Constitutional Court handed out criminal sanctions to those 
implicated in the Flick affair. As a result, a fair
comparison can be made with respect to judicial response, 
thus avoiding the complications of comparing judicial 
responses over time. However, discrepancies do exist in the 
time frame in which evidence was exposed in the two cases. 
This is due to the fact that the Flick affair was tried in a 
court of law, which required a comprehensive criminal 
investigation to be completed before criminal charges could 
be laid. In this instance, federal investigators spent
approximately a decade researching files, then a fact
finding committee established by the Bundestag sat for
another three years, this was followed by the trial.
In Canada, investigative responsibilities were given to 
the public inquiry's appointed prosecutors, who continued to 
collect evidence while the inquiry was sitting. The entire 
process consumed only eight months, and Parker released his
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findings less than a year after the inquiry came to an end. 
There was no necessity to define any legal charges in order 
for the inquiry to hear and evaluate evidence against 
Sinclair Stevens. Differences of time in the investigations 
had no bearing on the judicial comparison.
However, at the judicial level there is one very 
notable difference between the Flick and Stevens cases. In 
the West German case, charges had also been brought against 
a member of the private sector, von Brauchitsch, who 
initiated the corruption. In Canada, while individuals 
outside the government did as much to undermine the system 
as Stevens, in that they aided a minister in breaking the 
conflict of interest codes, they faced no sanctions. All 
that these businessmen suffered was a brief over-exposure to 
public scrutiny when called upon to testify before the 
public inquiry.
As mentioned in the first section of this paper, a key 
consideration was that the corruption occurred at the same 
level, the executive. In these two cases cabinet ministers 
from both West Germany and Canada were implicated, and in 
each instance, found to have been in violation of either 
statutory Laws, or codes of conduct for legislators. In 
both cases, the Cabinet ministers probably recognized that 
their actions were in violation of rules because they 
attempted to conceal their activities.
Knowledge of involvement was denied by all of the
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ministers. If unaware of the existence of the codes or laws 
that governed their behaviour, these men must have known 
that they were taking part in something others might 
consider unethical. Even if no violation had actually 
occurred, an appearance of a conflict of interest, or 
accepting a bribe, could be just as damaging for the 
integrity of the ministers, their political parties and the 
government. As pointed out by Justice William Parker, 
appearances do matter to the judiciary, and more 
importantly, to the public. Since the cases have been fully 
examined, comparisons can be made of the public, judicial 
and legislative responses taken after all of the evidence 
was collected.
At the level of public response, measures of reaction 
were difficult to observe. The most accurate measure is 
afforded by election results which could reflect electoral 
dissatisfaction with the politicians involved in corruption, 
and the parties which they were affiliated with. All other 
attempts to measure public reaction are completely
ambiguous. Public opinion regarding a government's
integrity must take in a broader range of factors, as the
public response to the Flick affair clearly illustrates. If 
the measure was limited merely to electoral results, only 
one conclusion could be drawn; people seemed unaffected by 
the revelations made about their political representatives. 
It is possible that other factors may have made the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
electorate look beyond the allegations made against the 
ministers, which again illustrates the limited importance 
given to the misconducts. In West Germany, elections at 
both the land and national levels did not result in any 
change of governing parties.
Or. only one occasion did a governing Land party suffer 
a significant loss in votes, but this was more likely on the 
basis of regional issues, not national. This non-response 
by the public may easily be explained by the fact that the
three major parties (CDU, SPD, PDF) which make up
governments at these two levels were all implicated to some 
degree in the Flick affair, and the electorate found no 
credible alternative to vote for. The emerging Green party, 
which was not tainted by Flick money, was unable to take 
advantage of the circumstances to increase its electoral 
support. Although the party maintained representation in 
the Bundestag, holding approximately five percent of the 
seats, it could not capitalize on the situation by drawing 
voters from those that were disenchanted by the main stream 
parties. Perhaps the best way to utilize electoral results 
is in terms of voter turnout. Average turnout in West
German federal elections since 1949 has been 87 per cent
(1). In 1987, only 84.3 per cent of eligible voters cast
their ballots. This was the second lowest turnout for a 
federal election since the first one held in 1949 (2).
In Canada, the public responded in a similar fashion.
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not allowing issues of executive conduct to determine their 
vote. The Progressive Conservatives were able to attract 
over forty percent of the popular vote, which allowed the 
party to maintain its large majority in the House of
Commons. Voter behaviour did not. appear to be negatively
influenced towaids the Progressive Conservative party by the 
revelations in the media that Stevens had violated conflict 
of interest guidelines. The electorate may well have to 
balance the various issues that would effect voting 
preference, with corruption being one of numerous
considerations. However, it may be that voters do not
equate corruption with a party's ability to govern 
effectively. It could just be perceived as a weakness 
solely attributable to the individual minister.
On the other hand, media response showed disapproval 
for the behaviour of the one Canadian minister and the two 
from West Germany, but there were some dissenters. Prior to 
the resolution of the Stevens case, some Canadian 
journalists levelled accusations of "pack" journalism 
against their colleagues, and made charges that the Parker 
inquiry was established on faulty grounds (3). Even though 
these accusations were unfounded, as the outcome of the 
Parker inquiry illustrates, it is fair to say that the 
hearings were initiated by newspaper reports. The inquiry 
was also suspected of being a forum which would quickly 
exonerate Stevens of all allegations on behalf of the
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government. When the inquiry's final report was released, 
it was clear that media response was one of disdain, not 
only towards Sinclair Stevens, but against Prime Minister 
Mulroney, who had vehemently defended his minister. 
Mulroney also stood by Canada's meager conflict of interest 
codes which were supposed to protect the political system 
against such abuses as perpetrated by Stevens.
Due to Hulroney's continued defence of both Stevens and 
the code, the media expressed reservations about all 
announcements of future, more complete codes that would 
replace what the Prime Minister had so energetically 
endorsed. In the Flick affair, media and academic response 
are similar in that they both condemned the actions that 
were uncovered. However, the media were somewhat more 
patient in the West German case. They waited to hear the 
evidence, and the court's decision, before proclaiming 
guilt; they did not rush to its own conclusions. However, 
Per Spiegel did at times find itself being persecuted by 
other West German media sources for a breach of privacy, and 
"anticipating condemnation of mere suspects"<4).
Academic papers which were examined clearly displayed 
signs of disapproval for the disregard that Friderichs and 
Count Lambsdorff bad for the public trust granted to their 
office. Not only had they secured benefits for themselves, 
but they aided in increasing the already noticeable 
discrepancies in representation between the wealthy and the
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poor. As with legislative response in Canada, West German 
legislative response has been viewed as ineffective, because 
it appears the new laws are only partial attempts at placing
limits on party funding levels. Even dissenters on the
Constitutional Court expressed astonishment at their 
colleagues' acceptance of the 1986 party law, which 
entrenched discrepancies in representation. Beyond this was 
the attempt to pass legislation that would have stopped
investigations into a number of other cases of illegal
campaign funding, and grant full amnesty to all suspects, 
from both the private and public sectors. This bill failed 
to be passed because of the strong public outcry against it.
One minor difference does exist in the forum of 
judicial comparison, however, it is easily overcome. While
the Flick affair was judged in the Constitutional Court,
Stevens was prosecuted by a public inquiry. Considering the 
mandate given the Parker Inquiry by the Privy Council, to
determine guilt or innocence, it served in a similar
capacity as a court of law. Although the definitional 
differences can be resolved for comparison, one area of
jurisdiction cannot be resolved. Justice William Parker was 
unable to impose any sanctions on a guilty Stevens. 
However, Parker's decision could be used as a basis for
either parliamentary sanctions, or any penalty the
Progressive Conservative party wished to impose.
In both of the cases, the defendants were found guilty
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of violating their positions of public trust. But in 
neither case did the de isions state that such behaviour 
constituted corruption. It was clearly stated in the 
decision of the West German Constitutional Court that 
although charges of corruption and bribery had to be dropped 
due to a lack of evidence, this did not necessarily mean 
that either had not taken place. As well, the decision 
stated that the original charges all seemed to have 
validity because of the supposed ability of citizens to
command legislative action on their behalf. Since the case 
was heard by a court of law, penalties were imposed upon von 
Lambsdorff, Friderichs and von Brauchitsch.
For the two former ministers, this meant fines for not 
reporting taxable income; von Brauchitsch was fined and also 
given a suspended sentence for not reporting taxable income. 
In Canada, the Parker Inquiry was only assigned the task of 
deciding if Stevens had violated conflict of interest codes. 
Its mandate did not state that the inquiry should determine 
whether the minister's actions were corrupt. As with the 
Flick affairs resolution, Sinclair Stevens was found guilty, 
but only of violating conflict of interest codes that were 
applicable only to ministers, not the Canadian criminal
code. Because only a code was violated, no prescribed
criminal sanctions could be imposed on the minister, a 
weakness shared with the inquiry. The House of Commons 
could have sanctioned Stevens, but chose not to.
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In both cases, there was full recognition by the 
judicial bodies that ministers had gone beyond the limits 
authorized by their posts. The three had used privileged 
access to their nation's business elite so that they could 
attempt to improve their own financial standing. Due to 
this, the two courts expressed a concern for the development 
of more comprehensive rules for legislators, especially 
members of the executive.
All three ministers found that their political careers 
were at the very least interrupted because of the
allegations made against them (5). Friderichs and Graf 
Lambsdorff had both resigned from their ministries prior to 
their trial. Stevens had resigned from Cabinet before the 
inquiry began hearings, but he continued to represent his 
constituency of York-Simcoe as a member of the Progressive 
Conservative party for a year after Parker had released his 
decision. It was the Prime Minister, under his authority as 
leader of the Progressive Conservative party, who denied 
Stevens the opportunity to contest the York-Peel riding in 
1988, overriding the wishes of the riding's nomination 
committee.
Stevens did have one option available to him which the 
three defendants in the Flick affair did not. Since it was 
only a public commission that found Stevens guilty, he still 
had the opportunity to appeal the decision in a court of 
law. An announcement of his intention t o - d o  so came
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immediately after the Parker report was issued in December 
1387. In contrast, since Friderichs' and Graf Lambsdorff's 
cases were pursued through West Germany's highest court, 
they could not file for an appeal.
As a result of the decisions that were brought down, 
the two legislatures took some initiative and tried to enact 
new regulatory legislation. The Bundestag had little 
interest in trying to reduce levels of party funding from 
the private sector because of the high cost of running 
election campaigns. Election costs were considered to be 
one of the impetuses for the persistent habit of politicians 
receiving secret funds on behalf of their parties. Since 
these funds were not reported in any fashion, there was no 
way of assuring that these hidden contributions would be 
deposited into the party accounts.
Instead of trying to reduce the ability of those with 
vast financial resources to influence those who can make 
decisions in their favour, the Bundestag drew up legislation 
that would allow these inequities to persist. This new 
Party Law dramatically increased the limits which 
individuals and corporations could contribute to political 
parties. Representative discrepancies were entrenched by 
the lack of reasonable limitations on campaign 
contributions, although these contributions were no longer 
kept secret.
Astonishment was voiced by political observers when
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this new law was accepted by the Constitutional Court, which 
had previously taken measures to stop laws that would allow 
these high level;, of private funding. On numerous occasions 
between 1967 and 1984 other such legislation had been 
brought to the Court by the Bundestag, but all were rejected 
on the grounds that they would give disproportionate 
representation based on wealth. One measure that the court 
allowed to be incorporated into this new law was an increase 
of public campaign financing, which gave each party $2.98 
fc every vote received in a federal election. A minimum of
one half a percent of the total vote had to be gained in
order for a party to be eligible for such funding. By 
increasing the level of public funding, the court expected 
that parties would be able to reduce their reliance on 
private funding, thus resulting in the desired effect that 
the court had hoped the parties would implement through 
parliamentary legislation.
In Canada, two notable, and potentially restrictive 
pieces of legislation have been proposed. The first 
conveniently died in 1988 on the Order Paper because of the
election called by the Prime Minister. It: may be considered
a convenient death because it proposed many means of 
ensuring compliance to codes of ethics that were unpopular 
among many legislators and their immediate families. Bill 
C-114 would have required that all legislators, their 
spouses and dependent children, give a full public
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disclosure of all assets. Such a disclosure had been 
suggested by Parker in his final report, and earlier in the 
Starr-Sharpe report, which was commissioned by the Liberal 
government of Prime Minister Trudeau to recommend measures 
that would resolve any weaknesses in the conflict of 
interest codes. This would have eliminated the need for the 
instrument of the "blind trust" which ®r.'Lor found to be a 
myth, and may have created heightened levels of public 
vigilance since the public could be informed of government 
guidelines, and have full access to HP's disclosures.
A public disclosure would also result in making it
impossible for legislators to place their personal assets 
under the name of a spcuse as Stevens was able to do. This 
legislation would also have allowed the House of Commons to 
impose sanctions on any member found to be in violation of 
it, which currently is not mandatory. One of these
sanctions would be the immediate resignation of a member, a
step which Stevens tiever voluntarily took, even after the
inquiry decided he was guilty of violating codes.
A second attempt to pass a more stringent code of
ethics began in November 1989. Again, bill C-46 would 
require public disclosures by all those listed in bill C-
114, and retains the ability to penalize violators. This
bill has not yet had its third reading, and there is no 
indication whether if will eventually pass.
These legislative responses are surprising in two
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regards. In Canada and West Germany, news of abuse of 
executive authority did not bring about a public call for 
more stringent guidelines to control executive actions. Nor 
did election results clearly reflect disapproval with 
governing parties maintaining power. Although it was just 
members of the FDP, and not the party itself that faced 
criminal prosecution, the party marginally increased its 
small federal constituency which allowed it to remain in a 
governing coalition with the CDU. Since the CDU is 
ideologically closer to the FDP than the SPD, it was not 
surprising that the coalition was able to survive after the 
allegations. The FDP made efforts to distance itself from 
the entire affair through its withdrawal of support from the 
proposed amnesty bill.
These circumstances are similar to those in Canada, 
where the government was not adversely affected by any of 
the revelations, and the Progressive Conservatives also took 
action to distance themselves from one of its own members. 
Legislatively, there appears to be little desire for the 
House of Commons or the Bundestag to implement restrictive 
legislation, even though pressure was applied to these 
bodies by the judicial fora that tried the two cases. All 
of this means that these abuses could occur a repeated 
number of times, which in turn would mean that these 
separate investigations, trials, and recommendations have 
all gone for naught.
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Of course, even the passage of comprehensive 
legislation in either Canada or West Germany would not 
assure the end of such practices in either country. Without 
a strong public demand, little if anything may be done by 
the legislatures to cease these actions. Condemnation by 
the media may initially arouse a public outcry against non-
responsive legislation, but such calls are short-lived as
the media leaves the issue t r  more pertinent ones. It may 
only be that the House of Commons and the Bundestag will be 
pressured into passing comprehensive legislation by the 
courts if further cases of abuse are tried. Once a case
gains the levels of notoriety achieved by the Flick affair
and the Stevens case, which brings with it a high level of 
media attention, legislation may ' ecome more restrictive.
Aside from the negative response that the judicial 
bodies had towards each case, the only other source of 
opposition to such activities was the media. They alone 
acted in the role of vigilante for the mass public, it
will be expected to continue in this self-defined role, 
because it does not appear that the public is willing or 
able, to assume this responsibility for itself. Even if the 
public did want to oversee legislator's actions, it mny be 
hard to obtain information except through the media. In 
some instances, charges of abuse may be unfounded, but that 
is a necessary evil if the system is to operate honestly and 
openly. The Globe and Mail reporters, Harris and Stewart-
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Patterson, might not have found evidence that Stevens did 
partake in any illicit activity. Had this been the case, a 
public inquiry would have been a tremendous waste of time 
and money, but it would still have been effective, in that 
it would clearly convey the message that such actions will 
not be tolerated by the Canadian political culture.
This examination of the Flick affair and the Sinclair 
Stevens case shows that many similarities exist between West 
Germany and Canada in terms of resolving recent allegations 
of corruption. The media is a necessary tool for informing 
the public, and the judiciary has proven that self­
regulation does not work for the legislatures in question. 
In the two situations, only the judiciary was willing to 
proclaim members of the executive guilty of violating 
ethical regulations.
From the legislatures themselves, a clear message has 
been sent. They felt little need to formulate more 
stringent regulations, and this sentiment may have been 
confirmed through the almost negligible public outcry. In 
an effort to appease a skeptical press, the German Bundestag 
designed and passed minimalist legislation: it had no
impact on the conduct of financial donors, political parties 
or politicians.
Canadian legislators have proposed restrictive rules, 
but none have yet been passed. Based on these facts, 
legislators do not seem concerned about executive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
mistreatment of authority that has distorted their political 
culture. Idle responses to severe breaches of trust will do 
nothing to stop the press from continuing to monitor
executive actions. Although evidence would point to a lack 
of public concern, with further announcements of abuse there 
may be a voter rebellion. But it is obvious that the
judiciary, although in both cases its desires have been
defeated by the legislators, would not put up with abuses.
Legislative bodies need to enforce judicial wishes, instead 
of continuing to work against judicial advances in
recognizing the harm of corruption.
The advantages to be found by completing a comparison 
are evident, in that it offers an opportunity to measure 
attitudinal differences at the public, judicial and
legislative levels of two or more countries. Of the three 
levels of comparison, it is the legislative response to acts 
of corruption that indicate the differences that exist
between each nation's attitudes towards corruption. 
Legislation should reflect both public and judicial demands 
for reform. Legislative responses come in two forms; the
ability of the legislature to expose all the facts in a case 
of corruption; how the legislature resolves problems of 
corruption, if they are resolved, legislatively.
By comparing responses elicited in each nation it can 
be seen to what degree a legislature is willing to restrict 
the behaviour of its members. Such a study can be fruitful
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
in a number of ways. Aside from its' obvious merits, that a
comparison can be drawn between two nations, the work may
encourage further studies into the realm of legislative 
response. As has been observed in this thesis, legislation 
in response to corrupt acts can at best be described as 
minimal, when it has been passed. Pointing out the lax
attitude of legislators towards their colleagues'
indiscretions means that the field of corruption is ripe for 
continued work. In fact, further developments in Canada and 
West Germany at trying to resolve legislative shortcomings, 
and the ensuing reactions deserve to be followed.
Benefits from studies of corruption should go beyond 
the bounds of academia, and may in fact force the issue of 
developing more stringent rules back to the legislatures. 
As research continues in the field of corruption it will 
become more difficult for elected representatives to avoid 
adopting, and adhering to codes governing their behaviour, 
A vigilant press and academic community could help assure 
compliance to rules (laws) because issues as serious as 
corruption would not be pushed aside for the next big news 
story. With increased attention, the public is granted the 
opportunity to become aware of the rules their 
representatives must comply with, which will give added 
incentive to legislators to do so.
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Appendix I
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Article 21
(1) The political parties shall take part in forming the 
political will of the people. They may be freely
established. Their internal organization must conform to 
democratic principles. They must publicly account for the 
sources of their funds.
Article 44
(1) The Bundestag shall have the right, and upon the
motion of one fourth of its members the duty, to set up a 
committee of investigation which shall take the requisite 
evidence at public hearings. The public may be excluded.
(2) The rules of criminal procedure shall apply mutatis to 
the taking of evidence. The privacy of posts and
telecommunications shall remain unaffected.
(3) Courts and administrative authorities shall be bound 
to render legal and administrative assistance.
(4) The decisions of committees of investigation shall not 
be subject to judicial consideration. The courts shall be 
free to evaluate and judge the facts on which the 
investigation is based.
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